Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Default enum value is NICE, rendering the "checkList" function to be irrelevant

Default enum value is NICE, rendering the "checkList" function to be irrelevant

Description

  • The "SantasList::Status" enum is used to track users who are eligible for a present

  • The default value is "NICE", meaning the "checkList" function is irrelevant

enum Status {
@> NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This is always the case

Impact:

  • The "SantasList::checkList" function is irrelevant

  • If the first check was never done, the second check would pass for "NICE", allowing users to mint an NFT should santa forget do do the first pass

Proof of Concept

  1. Santa checks "user" as NICE "twice", but forgets to check them "once"

  2. Christmas arrives

  3. User collects their present

  4. User now has an NFT

function testStatusDefaultToNice() public {
// 0. User has no NFT yet
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 0);
// 1. Santa checks the user "twice" as NICE, but forgets to check them "once"
vm.prank(santa);
santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.NICE);
// 2. Christmas arrives
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
// 3. User collects their present
vm.prank(user);
santasList.collectPresent();
// 4. User now has an NFT
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Make "NOT_CHECKED_TWICE" the first value of the "Status" enum.

Additionally, rename it to "UNKNOWN".

enum Status {
+ UNKNOWN,
NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
- NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 month ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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