Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

NFT is Transferable, So `SantasList::collectPresent` Can Be Called Multiple Times Per User To Mint Endless NFTs

NFT is Transferable, So SantasList::collectPresent Can Be Called Multiple Times Per User To Mint Endless NFTs

Description

The SantasList::collectPresent function attempts to prevent a user from calling it multiple times (and therefore receiving multiple NFTs and tokens) by requiring that the nft balance of the msg.sender is zero. However, because the erc721 transferFrom and safeTransferFrom functions are not shadowed, NFTs can be transferred. This means that a user can call collectPresent and then transfer his NFT to another address, and repeat this process an unlimited number of times.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
//HIGH Can transfer NFTs, so this can be called an unlimited amount of times
@> if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}

Risk

Likelihood: Any malicious user who is assigned a NICE or EXTRA_NICE status can carry out this attack.

Impact: A malicious user can mint an unlimited amount of NFTs.

Proof of Concept

The following unit test shows that a user can call collectPresent, transfer his NFT to user2, and then call collectPresent again to receive a second present.

function testCanTransferPresent() public {
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.startPrank(user);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
santasList.transferFrom(user, user2, 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user2), 1);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
vm.stopPrank();
}

Recommended Mitigation

The transfer functions should be shadowed to prevent their use.

+ /// @notice Override of transferFrom to prevent any transfer.
+ function transferFrom(address, address, uint256) public pure override {
+ revert PresentCannotByTransferred();
+ }
+ function safeTransferFrom(address, address, uint256, bytes memory) public pure override {
+ revert PresentCannotByTransferred();
+ }
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 14 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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