Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

collectPresent() Can Be Repeated by Transferring the NFT Away

Root + Impact

Description

Normal behavior:
The contract intends that each address can collect a present only once, as explicitly stated in the function documentation.
This invariant is meant to ensure fair distribution and controlled NFT supply.

Specific issue:
The contract enforces the one-time collection rule by checking balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0.
However, because ERC721 tokens are freely transferable, a user can transfer their NFT away after collecting a present, reducing their balance back to zero, and then call collectPresent() again.

As a result, the restriction only applies to current ownership, not to whether an address has already collected a present.

// Root cause in the codebase
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
// @> Balance-based check does not persist claim history
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
...
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Reason 1: ERC721 tokens are transferable by design, allowing balances to be reduced after minting

  • Reason 2: The check resets automatically after a transfer, enabling repeated calls without any special conditions

Impact:

  • Impact 1: A single address can collect an unbounded number of presents by repeatedly transferring the NFT away and calling collectPresent() again

  • Impact 2: The core invariant of “one present per address” is fully broken, leading to uncontrolled NFT supply inflation

Proof of Concept

// User collects a present
santasList.collectPresent();
// User transfers the NFT away
santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, other, tokenId);
// User balance is now zero
// User collects another present
santasList.collectPresent(); // succeeds

This sequence can be repeated indefinitely, allowing unlimited minting from a single address.

Recommended Mitigation

Track whether an address has already collected a present using persistent storage, rather than relying on token balance.

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
...
}

This ensures the one-time collection rule cannot be bypassed through token transfers.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 2 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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