Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Uninitialized Lists

Root + Impact

Description

  • The naughty lists are initialized at a value of zero because they are mappings.

  • Since an enumerator is being used, the zero value is mapped into the NICE status.

enum Status {
@> NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}
@> mapping(address person => Status naughtyOrNice) private s_theListCheckedOnce;
@> mapping(address person => Status naughtyOrNice) private s_theListCheckedTwice;

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This mistake can be easily noticeable by attackers and requires basic knowledge of Solidity, so it's a medium.

Impact:

  • Not a vulnerability by itself but can cause logic errors if not checked.

Recommended Mitigation

Adding an UNKNOWN value to the enumerator at the zero index would solve this.

enum Status {
+ UNKNOWN,
NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 9 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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