Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[H-04] collectPresent() uses current NFT balance instead of permanent claim tracking

Root + Impact

Description

  • Each address should be able to collect its Christmas present only once.

  • The contract determines whether an address has already collected by checking its current ERC721 balance:

    if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
    revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
    }

    However, ERC721 tokens are transferable. A user can therefore:

    1. Collect a present.

    2. Transfer the NFT to another address.

    3. Reduce their NFT balance to zero.

    4. Call collectPresent() again.

    The contract has no permanent record that the address has already claimed.

    For an EXTRA_NICE user, the repeated claim can also trigger another SantaToken mint.

if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { // @> Current balance does not represent historical claim status. revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); }

However, ERC721 tokens are transferable. A user can therefore:

  1. Collect a present.

  2. Transfer the NFT to another address.

  3. Reduce their NFT balance to zero.

  4. Call collectPresent() again.

The contract has no permanent record that the address has already claimed.

For an EXTRA_NICE user, the repeated claim can also trigger another SantaToken mint.



Risk

Likelihood:

  • ERC721 NFTs can be transferred.

  • The contract checks only current ownership.

  • A previous NFT can therefore be moved away from the claiming address.

Impact:

  • A user can collect multiple presents.

  • NFT supply can be increased beyond the intended one-per-address distribution.

  • EXTRA_NICE users can repeatedly receive SantaTokens.

Proof of Concept

function testCanClaimAgainAfterTransferringNFT() public { address alice = makeAddr("alice"); address bob = makeAddr("bob"); // Configure Alice as NICE in the test setup. // ... vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME); vm.prank(alice); santasList.collectPresent(); assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(alice), 1); // Alice transfers her NFT away. vm.prank(alice); santasList.transferFrom(alice, bob, 0); assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(alice), 0); // Alice can now claim again. vm.prank(alice); santasList.collectPresent(); assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(alice), 1); }

  1. alice is configured as a NICE user and claims her present by calling collectPresent().

  2. Alice receives NFT tokenId = 0, so her NFT balance becomes 1.

  3. Alice transfers that NFT to bob, reducing her NFT balance back to 0.

  4. The contract does not preserve a permanent record that Alice has already claimed her present.

  5. Alice calls collectPresent() again and the transaction succeeds.

  6. Alice receives another NFT, proving that transferring the first NFT resets the effective claim state.

Therefore, the NFT itself is being used as the indication of whether a user has claimed. Because ownership can be transferred, a user can dispose of their NFT and subsequently claim again.

Expected behavior: A user's eligibility to claim should be consumed permanently after the first successful claim, regardless of whether the previously claimed NFT is later transferred.


Recommended Mitigation

Track historical claims independently from NFT ownership:
+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
// existing eligibility logic...
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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