Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Enum default value makes unchecked addresses default to NICE

Root + Impact

Description

The Status enum defines NICE as the first value (index 0):

In Solidity, uninitialized mapping values default to 0. This means any address that has never been checked by Santa has a default status of NICE in both s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice.

the collectPresent function checks:

@> if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE
@> && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE)


Both conditions are true for any unchecked address.

enum Status {
@> NICE, // 0 — same as mapping default value!
EXTRA_NICE, // 1
NAUGHTY, // 2
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE // 3
}
@> if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE
@> && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE)

Risk


Impact:

  • Anyone can collect an NFT without ever being checked by Santa. This completely bypasses the naughty/nice list system.

Proof of Concept

A brand new address nobody is created that Santa has never checked. The test first verifies that both mappings return Status.NICE (the default 0 value) for this address. Then after warping to Christmas, nobody successfully calls collectPresent and receives an NFT — despite never being on any list.

function testH4_UncheckedAddressCanCollectPresent() public {
address nobody = makeAddr("nobody");
// nobody was NEVER checked by Santa
// but default mapping value is 0 = Status.NICE
assertEq(
uint256(santasList.getNaughtyOrNiceOnce(nobody)),
uint256(SantasList.Status.NICE)
);
assertEq(
uint256(santasList.getNaughtyOrNiceTwice(nobody)),
uint256(SantasList.Status.NICE)
);
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
// nobody can collect NFT without ever being checked
vm.prank(nobody);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(nobody), 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

enum Status {
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE, // 0 (default)
NICE, // 1
EXTRA_NICE, // 2
NAUGHTY // 3
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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