Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

[M-01] `buyPresent()` charges 1e18 SantaTokens instead of the documented `PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST` (2e18)

Description

SantasList defines PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18 and the README states "trades 2e18 of SantaToken for an NFT." But buyPresent() calls i_santaToken.burn() which always burns exactly 1e18, never referencing the constant. Presents cost half of what the protocol specifies.

Vulnerability Details

// src/SantasList.sol, line 88
uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18; // @> defined as 2e18
// src/SantasList.sol, lines 172-175
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); // @> burns 1e18, not PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST
_mintAndIncrement();
}
// src/SantaToken.sol, lines 28-33
function burn(address from) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
_burn(from, 1e18); // @> hardcoded 1e18, ignores PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST
}

The PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST constant is declared, documented in the README, but never actually used in any function. The SantaToken.burn() function hardcodes 1e18 regardless.

This is separate from the reversed-arguments bug in buyPresent() (H-02). Even if the burn target were corrected to msg.sender, the cost would still be 1e18 instead of 2e18.

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Occurs on every buyPresent() call. The wrong cost is hardcoded.

Impact:

  • NFTs cost 50% less than intended. Since EXTRA_NICE users receive 1e18 SantaTokens from collectPresent(), they can immediately buy a present with their full balance. The intended design requires 2e18, meaning a single collect should not be enough to buy a present.

Proof of Concept

function testExploit_WrongCost() public {
// Setup: user is EXTRA_NICE, collects 1e18 SantaTokens
vm.prank(santa);
santasList.checkList(attacker, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.prank(santa);
santasList.checkTwice(attacker, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.prank(attacker);
santasList.collectPresent();
uint256 balance = santaToken.balanceOf(attacker);
assertEq(balance, 1e18);
// User can buy a present with 1e18 tokens
// But PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST says it should cost 2e18
// With the correct cost, this call should revert (insufficient balance)
uint256 purchasedPresentCost = santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST();
assertEq(purchasedPresentCost, 2e18);
// The actual burn is 1e18, not 2e18
// (Note: using attacker as receiver due to H-02 bug)
vm.prank(attacker);
santasList.buyPresent(attacker); // burns 1e18 from attacker, not 2e18
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(attacker), 0); // 1e18 - 1e18 = 0
// If cost were correct (2e18), this would have reverted
}

Recommendations

Pass the cost amount to SantaToken.burn():

// SantaToken.sol
- function burn(address from) external {
+ function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
- _burn(from, 1e18);
+ _burn(from, amount);
}
// SantasList.sol
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
- i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
+ i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
_mintAndIncrement();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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