Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

H-2: Enum default value NICE allows unchecked addresses to collect presents

Description

The Status enum at SantasList.sol:69-74 has NICE as value 0:

enum Status {
NICE, // 0 — this is the default!
EXTRA_NICE, // 1
NAUGHTY, // 2
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE // 3
}

Solidity mappings default to 0 for uninitialized keys. Both s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice return NICE (0) for any address that was never checked.

The collectPresent function at line 154 checks:

if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE)

Since both mappings default to NICE, any address that was never checked by Santa can call collectPresent() and mint an NFT.

Risk

  • Impact: High — anyone can collect presents without being on Santa's list.

  • Likelihood: High — no prerequisites needed.

Recommended Mitigation

Reorder the enum so the default (0) is a non-eligible status:

enum Status {
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE, // 0 — safe default
NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 3 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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