Description
collectPresent is intended to allow each address to collect at most one present. It enforces this with a guard that
checks whether the caller currently holds any NFT from this contract.
Because the guard uses balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0 rather than a persistent per-address flag, transferring the minted
NFT to any other address resets the balance to zero and allows the same address to call collectPresent again
indefinitely. An EXTRA_NICE address can exploit this loop to accumulate unlimited SantaTokens, then use those tokens
against victims via buyPresent.
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
// @> Uses current ERC721 balance — drops to 0 after any transfer
// @> A persistent s_alreadyCollected[msg.sender] flag is never set
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE)
{
_mintAndIncrement();
return;
} else if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
// @> 1e18 SantaToken minted on every loop iteration for EXTRA_NICE
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}
Risk
Likelihood:
Any address marked EXTRA_NICE by Santa can execute this loop — transferring the NFT is a standard ERC721 operation
requiring no privilege or special condition
The loop runs in consecutive blocks with minimal gas cost per iteration, making large-scale token accumulation
practical
Impact:
Unlimited NFTs are minted, destroying the collection's scarcity
For EXTRA_NICE addresses, unlimited SantaTokens are accumulated, which can then be used to drain other users' token
balances via buyPresent
Proof of Concept
function testCollectPresentUnlimitedViaTransfer() public {
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
address burner = makeAddr("burner");
vm.startPrank(user);
// Iteration 1
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 1e18);
santasList.transferFrom(user, burner, 0); // balance drops to 0
santasList.collectPresent(); // succeeds again
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18);
santasList.transferFrom(user, burner, 1);
santasList.collectPresent(); // succeeds a third time
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 3e18);
vm.stopPrank();
}
Recommended Mitigation
Replace the balanceOf check with a persistent boolean mapping:
mapping(address => bool) private s_alreadyCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
if (s_alreadyCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
s_alreadyCollected[msg.sender] = true;
// ... rest unchanged
}
## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```
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