Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Enum default NICE=0 allows uninitialized addresses to collect presents

Title: Enum default NICE=0 allows uninitialized addresses to collect presents
Severity: High
Impact: Every blockchain address can mint an NFT without any Santa interaction.
Likelihood: High — zero preconditions, one call after Christmas timestamp.
Reference Files: src/SantasList.sol:69-74, src/SantasList.sol:147-166

Description

The Status enum places NICE at position 0, making it the mapping default. Both s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice return Status(0) == NICE for any uninitialized address, so collectPresent passes every address. The vulnerable code:

enum Status {
NICE, // = 0 — DEFAULT for ALL uninitialized addresses
EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY, NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement(); // ANY address reaches this
return;
}

Santa never needs to check anyone — every address is already "double-checked as NICE" by default.

Risk

Impact: High. The entire two-phase checking system is meaningless. Billions of addresses qualify as NICE without Santa ever calling checkList or checkTwice.
Likelihood: High. Wait for Christmas timestamp, call collectPresent(). One transaction, zero setup.
Every single Ethereum address is pre-approved to collect a Christmas NFT with no authorization whatsoever.

Proof of Concept

function testAnyoneCanCollectByDefault() public {
address randomPerson = makeAddr("randomPerson");
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.prank(randomPerson);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(randomPerson), 1);
}

A completely unknown address collects an NFT — Santa never checked them, proving the default NICE bypass.

Recommended Mitigation

enum Status {
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY
}

Moving NOT_CHECKED_TWICE to position 0 makes it the default. Uninitialized addresses fail the NICE check in collectPresent, correctly reverting with SantasList__NotNice.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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