Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

collectPresent() can be re-called by transferring away the minted NFT, allowing unlimited minting of presents and SantaTokens

Root + Impact

Description

collectPresent is documented as one-time ("addresses should not be able to collect more than once"). It enforces this only by checking the caller's current NFT balance:

function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
@> if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
return;
} else if (... EXTRA_NICE ...) {
_mintAndIncrement();
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); // mints 1e18 SantaToken
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}

The guard relies on balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0, but the minted present is a transferable ERC721. After collecting, the user can transfer the NFT to another address, dropping their balance back to 0, and call collectPresent again. An EXTRA_NICE user can loop collect -> transfer -> collect indefinitely, minting unlimited present NFTs and unlimited 1e18 SantaTokens. The "collect once" invariant is fully bypassable, breaking SantaToken supply.

Risk

Likelihood: High - any eligible (NICE/EXTRA_NICE) user can do this with ordinary ERC721 transfers; no special privilege required.

Impact: High - unlimited minting of SantaTokens (and present NFTs), destroying the token's supply/value and the one-present-per-person guarantee.

Proof of Concept

An EXTRA_NICE user collects three times by offloading the NFT between calls, ending with 3e18 SantaTokens. Runnable Foundry test (add to SantasListTest.t.sol):

function test_PoC_collectPresentInfiniteMint() public {
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME());
address sink = makeAddr("sink");
vm.startPrank(user);
santasList.collectPresent(); // NFT id 0 + 1e18
santasList.transferFrom(user, sink, 0); // balanceOf(user) -> 0
santasList.collectPresent(); // NFT id 1 + 1e18
santasList.transferFrom(user, sink, 1);
santasList.collectPresent(); // NFT id 2 + 1e18
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 3e18); // collected 3x despite once-only intent
}

Run forge test --mt test_PoC_collectPresentInfiniteMint -vv; it passes - the user minted 3e18.

Recommended Mitigation

Track collection with a dedicated flag instead of NFT balance, so transferring the NFT cannot reset eligibility:

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_collected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
+ if (s_collected[msg.sender]) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
+ s_collected[msg.sender] = true;
...
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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