Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

buyPresent charges 1e18 instead of PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST (2e18), selling every present at half price

buyPresent charges a hardcoded 1e18 through SantaToken.burn while the declared price PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST is 2e18, so every present is sold at half price.

Description

  • A purchased present is documented to cost PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST, declared as 2e18 at src/SantasList.sol:88.

  • buyPresent (src/SantasList.sol:172) charges through SantaToken.burn, which hardcodes 1e18 (src/SantaToken.sol:32) and never reads the constant. PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST is dead code, so the real price paid is 1e18, exactly half of what the protocol advertises.

// src/SantasList.sol
uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18; // declared price, never read
// ...
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
@> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); // burns a fixed amount
_mintAndIncrement();
}
// src/SantaToken.sol
function burn(address from) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
@> _burn(from, 1e18); // fixed 1e18, not 2e18
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Every buyPresent call is mispriced. An address holding only 1e18, below the declared 2e18, still buys a present.

Impact:

  • Presents are sold at half their intended price, which under-charges every buyer and breaks the protocol's pricing model.

  • This is an economic accounting flaw rather than a direct fund drain, so it is a Medium severity issue.

Proof of Concept

A holder of only 1e18, below the declared 2e18 cost, still buys a present. The test passes.

function test_F5_costoMitad() public {
_fundWithTokens(victim); // victim has 1e18, half of 2e18
assertEq(santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST(), 2e18);
assertLt(santaToken.balanceOf(victim), santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST()); // 1e18 < 2e18
uint256 nftBefore = santasList.balanceOf(victim);
vm.prank(victim);
santasList.buyPresent(victim); // succeeds with only 1e18
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(victim), nftBefore + 1); // received the present
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(victim), 0); // only 1e18 was burned, not 2e18
}

Recommended Mitigation

Charge the declared cost. Let burn take an explicit amount and have buyPresent pass PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST.

// src/SantaToken.sol
- function burn(address from) external {
+ function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
- _burn(from, 1e18);
+ _burn(from, amount);
}
// src/SantasList.sol
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
- i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
+ i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
_mintAndIncrement();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 9 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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