Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

collectPresent: the Status enum defaults to NICE (index 0), so any unchecked address passes the nice check and mints a free NFT

Status enum defaults to NICE (index 0), letting any unchecked address mint a free present

Description

The Status enum lists NICE first, so NICE == 0, which is the default value of every uninitialized mapping entry. In collectPresent, the nice-path check passes for any address Santa never touched because both lists default to NICE.

enum Status {
NICE, // @> NICE is index 0 = default value of every mapping slot
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}
// SantasList.sol:154
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {

Risk

Likelihood: High

Every address that Santa never processes has s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice reading as NICE by default. Since the Christmas timestamp gate is already in the past, the nice branch is reachable by anyone right now with no setup.

Impact: High

Any arbitrary address can call collectPresent and mint a free SANTA NFT, defeating the entire naughty-or-nice gating. Santa's curation of the list confers no benefit because the default already satisfies the nice branch.

Proof of Concept

A fresh address that was never checked successfully mints.

function test_uncheckedAddressMintsFreePresent() public {
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME());
address stranger = makeAddr("stranger");
vm.prank(stranger);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(stranger), 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Reorder the enum so the zero/default value is a non-collectible state, or guard against the default explicitly.

enum Status {
- NICE,
+ NOT_CHECKED_TWICE, // index 0 = default, not collectible
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
- NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
+ NICE
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!