Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

buyPresent charges only 1e18 SantaToken instead of PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST (2e18) — presents are bought at half the intended cost

buyPresent charges only 1e18 instead of the intended PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST of 2e18, selling presents at half price

Description

A present is meant to cost PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18, but buyPresent never references that constant and instead relies on SantaToken.burn, which always burns exactly 1e18. The cost constant is dead and presents are bought for half the intended price.

// SantasList.sol:88
uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18; // @> never used by buyPresent
// SantaToken.sol:32
function burn(address from) external {
...
_burn(from, 1e18); // @> always 1e18, not PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

Every purchase goes through burn, which is hardcoded to 1e18. There is no code path that ever consumes PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST, so the underpricing happens on every single call.

Impact: Medium

Buyers obtain presents for 1e18 instead of the specified 2e18, a 50% discount that breaks the token sink/economics the protocol intended. The mispricing is systematic rather than edge-case, though it does not directly drain third parties.

Proof of Concept

Buying a present reduces the payer's balance by only 1e18.

function test_presentCostsHalfTheIntendedAmount() public {
uint256 before = santaToken.balanceOf(buyer);
vm.prank(buyer);
santasList.buyPresent(buyer);
assertEq(before - santaToken.balanceOf(buyer), 1e18); // actual
assertEq(santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST(), 2e18); // intended
}

Recommended Mitigation

Parameterize the burn amount and have buyPresent burn the full cost.

// SantaToken.sol
- function burn(address from) external {
+ function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
...
- _burn(from, 1e18);
+ _burn(from, amount);
}
// SantasList.sol buyPresent
- i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender);
+ i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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