Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

EXTRA_NICE can infinitely issue SantaToken through repeated redemption, forming an economic attack.

Root + Impact

Description

  • Normal: The EXTRA_NICE user calls collectPresent() once to obtain a token and an NFT.

  • Error: After the EXTRA_NICE user calls collectPresent() once, they can transfer the NFT away because the collectPresent() function does not check the number of redemptions. Subsequently, they can call collectPresent() again

function collectPresent() external {
//@>This function does not check the number of times it is called by the caller.
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
return;
} else if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • After NICE and EXTRA_NICE users call the collectPresent() function, they can transfer the NFT and then call the collectPresent() function again to obtain additional rewards.

Impact:

After NICE and EXTRA_NICE users call the collectPresent() function, they can transfer the NFT and then call the collectPresent() function again to obtain additional rewards. However, EXTRA_NICE users can obtain extra tokens every time they call, causing financial losses to the contract.

Proof of Concept

NICE and EXTRA_NICE users call the collectPresent() function for the first time to obtain rewards.

They transfer the NFT they obtained for the first time to other users, and then call the collectPresent() function again to obtain additional rewards.

NICE users can obtain NFTs every time.

And EXTRA_NICE users can obtain additional tokens every time, causing financial losses to the contract.

function test_c() public {
address b = makeAddr("b");
address c = makeAddr("c");
vm.startPrank(santa);
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
santasList.checkList(b, SantasList.Status.NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(b, SantasList.Status.NICE);
santasList.checkList(c, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(c, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(b);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(address(b), address(user), 0);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(c);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(address(c), address(user), 1);
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 2);
vm.startPrank(b);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(address(b), address(user), 2);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(c);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(address(c), address(user), 3);
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 4);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Add an array to specifically record the number of times each address calls the collectPresent() function, and add a verification check in collectPresent() to require the caller to only call the collectPresent() function once.

+ mapping(address person => callCount) private hasCallCount;
mapping(address person => Status naughtyOrNice) private s_theListCheckedOnce;
mapping(address person => Status naughtyOrNice) private s_theListCheckedTwice;
address private immutable i_santa;
uint256 private s_tokenCounter;
SantaToken private immutable i_santaToken;
// This variable is ok even if it's off by 24 hours.
uint256 public constant CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME = 1_703_480_381;
// The cost of santa tokens for naughty people to buy presents
uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18;
function collectPresent() external {
+ require(hasCallCount[msg.sender] = 0);
+ if(hasCallCount[msg.sender] = 0){
+ hasCallCount[msg.sender] = 1;
+ }
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
return;
} else if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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