Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Users can call `collectPresent()` multiple times by transferring NFT away → infinite mint of NFTs and SantaTokens

Description

  • Normal: Each user should only be able to collect a present once. The contract enforces this by checking if the user already owns an NFT.

  • Bug: The anti-recollection check uses balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0. A user can bypass this by simply transferring their NFT to another wallet after collecting, resetting their balance to 0.

// src/SantasList.sol:151-152
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}

For EXTRA_NICE users, this means infinite SantaToken minting as well, since collectPresent() also calls i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender) for them.

Risk

Likelihood: Any NICE or EXTRA_NICE user can exploit this. Only requires a second wallet address.

Impact:

  • NICE users: Infinite NFT minting

  • EXTRA_NICE users: Infinite NFT minting AND infinite SantaToken minting → complete token supply collapse

  • SantaToken can be used to call buyPresent() for even more NFTs

Proof of Concept

function test_CollectPresentMultipleTimes() public {
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
address wallet2 = makeAddr("wallet2");
// Santa makes attacker EXTRA_NICE
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(attacker, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(attacker, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(1_703_480_382);
vm.startPrank(attacker);
// First collection
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(attacker), 1e18);
// Transfer NFT away → balanceOf becomes 0
santasList.safeTransferFrom(attacker, wallet2, 0);
// Second collection — succeeds!
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(attacker), 2e18); // Double tokens!
}

Run with:

forge test --match-test test_CollectPresentMultipleTimes -vvv

Result: [PASS] test_CollectPresentMultipleTimes() — vulnerability confirmed.

Recommended Mitigation

Use a dedicated mapping to track claims instead of relying on NFT balance:

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
return;
} else if (...) {
_mintAndIncrement();
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 3 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!