SantasList declares a public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18 that documents the number of SantaTokens required to purchase a present via buyPresent. The README confirms this: "A function that trades 2e18 of SantaToken for an NFT."
SantaToken.burn — the only function that destroys tokens — hard-codes a burn amount of 1e18 rather than accepting an amount parameter or referencing PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST. As a result, every call to buyPresent costs exactly half the documented price. The constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST is declared but never referenced anywhere in the codebase — it is dead documentation:
Likelihood:
Every single call to buyPresent (after fixing CRIT-02) will burn only 1e18 tokens — the discrepancy affects 100% of transactions.
No special conditions are needed; the mismatch is structural and permanent until a contract upgrade or redeployment.
Impact:
The economic model is broken: users pay half the price documented in the spec and the README.
Token supply deflation is half the intended rate, affecting the scarcity and incentive model for SantaTokens.
PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST existing as dead code creates a false sense of correctness for reviewers who see the constant and assume it is enforced.
Explanation: The test reads PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST from SantasList (which is 2e18) and then exercises SantaToken.burn directly (simulating a buyPresent call). The actual amount burned is 1e18 — exactly half the documented constant. The test asserts they do not match, confirming the invariant violation.
Explanation: Parameterising the burn amount removes the hard-coded value and delegates the cost decision to the caller (SantasList). SantasList then uses the existing PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST constant, making the constant live code rather than dead documentation. This ties the on-chain enforcement directly to the documented invariant. If the cost needs to change in a future upgrade, only one constant needs updating rather than hunting for magic numbers across multiple contracts.
## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
Submissions are being reviewed by our AI judge. Results will be available in a few minutes.
View all submissionsThe contest is complete and the rewards are being distributed.