Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

buyPresent charges only one SantaToken despite the declared two-token cost

Root + Impact

Description

SantasList declares the purchase price as 2e18 SantaToken, but buyPresent() never uses that constant. It calls SantaToken.burn(), whose amount is hard-coded to only 1e18.

uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18;
​
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
_mintAndIncrement();
}
function burn(address from) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
_burn(from, 1e18);
}

Consequently, a user holding exactly one SantaToken can purchase an NFT even though the public protocol price says two tokens are required. The duplicated literal makes the effective economic rule diverge from its single intended source of truth.

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • The undercharge occurs deterministically on every successful purchase.

  • Any holder of 1e18 can use it; no special timing or privilege is needed.

Impact: Medium

  • Purchased presents cost half the intended amount, diluting the purchase economy and NFT scarcity.

  • This does not by itself mint for free or grant an administrative role, so Medium is appropriate.

Proof of Concept

function test_BuyPresentChargesHalfTheDeclaredCost() public {
address buyer = makeAddr("buyer");
​
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(buyer, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(buyer, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
​
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME());
vm.prank(buyer);
santasList.collectPresent();
​
SantaToken token = SantaToken(santasList.getSantaToken());
assertEq(santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST(), 2e18);
assertEq(token.balanceOf(buyer), 1e18);
​
vm.prank(buyer);
santasList.buyPresent(buyer);
​
assertEq(token.balanceOf(buyer), 0);
assertEq(santasList.ownerOf(1), buyer);
}

The call succeeds although the buyer never held the declared 2e18 cost.

Recommended Mitigation

Pass the intended amount through the payment flow and remove the divergent literal:

-function burn(address from) external {
+function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
- _burn(from, 1e18);
+ _burn(from, amount);
}
​
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
- i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
+ i_santaToken.burn(msg.sender, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
// mint to the intended receiver
}

This amount fix should be combined with the separate payer-authorization correction. Add tests that 1e18 is insufficient, 2e18 succeeds, and changing PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST changes the actual debit.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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