Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

collectPresent() 'already collected' check reads balanceOf() — transfer the NFT away and collect again, unlimited

Root + Impact

Description

The "already collected" guard in collectPresent() reads the caller's NFT balance:

@> if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
@> revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
@> }

NFTs are transferable, so a user who collects, transfers the NFT away, and collects again passes the guard every time. There is no per-address "collected" flag — the balance is used as a proxy for it, and the balance can be reset to zero by a normal ERC721 transfer. Each re-collection also mints another SantaToken for EXTRA_NICE users, so the attacker farms unlimited NFTs and unlimited SantaTokens.

Risk

Likelihood: Medium — the attacker must first be NICE or EXTRA_NICE (a legitimate checked state), then perform one ordinary NFT transfer between collects.

Impact: High — unlimited minting of the protocol's NFT and of SantaToken (1e18 per re-collection for EXTRA_NICE users), destroying the scarcity of both and letting one user drain the entire present supply.

Proof of Concept

An EXTRA_NICE user collects three times, transferring the NFT away between collects, and ends with 3 SantaTokens (and 3 NFTs minted in total).

function test_H4_doubleCollectByTransferringNftAway() public {
_markExtraNice(user);
​
vm.startPrank(user);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 1e18);
​
// Transfer the NFT away -> balanceOf is 0 again.
santasList.transferFrom(user, other, 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 0);
​
// Collect AGAIN: the AlreadyCollected check passes.
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1, "second NFT collected");
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18, "second SantaToken farmed");
vm.stopPrank();
​
// And again -- it is unlimited.
vm.startPrank(user);
santasList.transferFrom(user, other, 1);
santasList.collectPresent();
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1, "third NFT collected");
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 3e18, "third SantaToken farmed");
vm.stopPrank();
}

Recommended Mitigation

Track collection with a dedicated per-address flag set on first collection, instead of reading the transferable NFT balance.

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasCollected;
...
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
...
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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