Finding 1: Signature Replay in SnowmanAirdrop.sol due to Lack of Nonce / Expiry Tracking
[H-01] ECDSA Signatures can be replayed indefinitely to claim unauthorized NFTs
Severity: High
Impact: Critical (Direct loss of NFT assets / Excessive Minting)
Description:
The SnowmanAirdrop contract allows users to claim NFTs on behalf of recipients using ECDSA signatures (v, r, s). However, the contract fails to track used signatures or include a nonce and deadline within the signed digest payload.
Because the signed message digest only contains static parameters (such as account and amount), a signature generated once by a valid recipient can be captured by anyone and repeatedly submitted (replayed) to the contract.
Impact:
An attacker or malicious actor can intercept a valid v, r, s signature from the mempool or previous transactions and re-submit it multiple times. This allows them to mint an unlimited number of Snowman NFTs without authorization from the original owner.
Proof of Concept (PoC):
User A generates a valid ECDSA signature (v, r, s) to allow User B to claim 1 Snowman NFT.
User B calls the claim function with (v, r, s) and receives the NFT.
User B (or an observer in the mempool) calls the exact same claim function again using the identical (v, r, s) signature.
The contract verifies ECDSA.recover() successfully again and mints an extra NFT.
Recommended Mitigation:
Implement a mapping(address => uint256) public nonces or mapping(bytes32 => bool) public usedSignatures to mark signatures as used after execution:
Solidity
bytes32 sigHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(v, r, s));
require(!usedSignatures[sigHash], "Signature already used");
usedSignatures[sigHash] = true;
Integrate EIP-712 structured data hashing including nonce, deadline, and block.chainid to prevent cross-chain and replay attacks.
Finding 2: Missing Access Control on Snowman.sol Mint Function
[H-02] Unrestricted mint() function in Snowman.sol allows arbitrary user minting bypassing Snow token staking
Severity: High
Impact: High (Bypasses core protocol logic)
Description:
According to the protocol specification, Snowman NFTs should only be minted to users who stake their Snow tokens inside the SnowmanAirdrop.sol contract.
However, the mint() function inside Snowman.sol lacks an access control modifier (such as onlyOwner or onlyAirdrop). As a result, the function is exposed publicly and can be called by any external address (msg.sender).
Impact:
Users do not need to buy, farm, or stake Snow tokens to acquire Snowman NFTs. Anyone can call Snowman::mint() directly from Etherscan or a script and mint as many NFTs as they want for free, completely breaking the tokenomics and staking mechanism of Snow.sol.
Proof of Concept (PoC):
Alice notices the Snowman.sol contract address on-chain.
Without holding or staking any Snow ERC-20 tokens, Alice calls Snowman.mint(Alice, tokenId) directly.
The transaction succeeds and mints the NFT to Alice's wallet, bypassing SnowmanAirdrop.sol.
Recommended Mitigation:
Add access control to the mint function in Snowman.sol so that only the SnowmanAirdrop contract is authorized to mint NFTs:
Solidity
address public immutable i_airdropContract;
modifier onlyAirdrop() {
require(msg.sender == i_airdropContract, "Not authorized");
_;
}
function mint(address to, uint256 tokenId) external onlyAirdrop {
_safeMint(to, tokenId);
}
# Root + Impact ## Description * The Snowman NFT contract is designed to mint NFTs through a controlled airdrop mechanism where only authorized entities should be able to create new tokens for eligible recipients. * The `mintSnowman()` function lacks any access control mechanisms, allowing any external address to call the function and mint unlimited NFTs to any recipient without authorization, completely bypassing the intended airdrop distribution model. ```Solidity // Root cause in the codebase function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { @> // NO ACCESS CONTROL - Any address can call this function for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } @> // NO VALIDATION - No checks on amount or caller authorization } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: * The vulnerability will be exploited as soon as any malicious actor discovers the contract address, since the function is publicly accessible with no restrictions * Automated scanning tools and MEV bots continuously monitor new contract deployments for exploitable functions, making discovery inevitable **Impact**: * Complete destruction of tokenomics through unlimited supply inflation, rendering all legitimate NFTs worthless * Total compromise of the airdrop mechanism, allowing attackers to mint millions of tokens and undermine the project's credibility and economic model ## Proof of Concept ```Solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.24; import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol"; contract SnowmanExploitPoC is Test { Snowman public snowman; address public attacker = makeAddr("attacker"); string constant SVG_URI = ""; function setUp() public { snowman = new Snowman(SVG_URI); } function testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() public { console2.log("=== UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT ==="); console2.log("Initial token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance before:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // EXPLOIT: Anyone can mint unlimited NFTs vm.prank(attacker); snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000); // Mint 1K NFTs console2.log("Final token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance after:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // Verify exploit success assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 1000); assertEq(snowman.getTokenCounter(), 1000); console2.log(" EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization"); } } ``` <br /> PoC Results: ```Solidity forge test --match-test testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting -vv [⠑] Compiling... [⠢] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.29 [⠰] Solc 0.8.29 finished in 1.45s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/SnowmanExploitPoC.t.sol:SnowmanExploitPoC [PASS] testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() (gas: 26868041) Logs: === UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT === Initial token counter: 0 Attacker balance before: 0 Final token counter: 1000 Attacker balance after: 1000 EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.28ms (3.58ms CPU time) Ran 1 test suite in 10.15ms (4.28ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests) ``` ## Recommended Mitigation Adding the `onlyOwner` modifier restricts the `mintSnowman()` function to only be callable by the contract owner, preventing unauthorized addresses from minting NFTs. ```diff - function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { + function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } } ```
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