Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Global Weekly Cooldown Enables Griefing/DoS in Snow.earnSnow()

Summary
The earn cooldown is global (s_earnTimer) instead of per-user, so one user’s call blocks everyone else from earning for one week.

Vulnerability Details
earnSnow() checks and updates a single global timestamp:

  • check: src/Snow.sol:93

  • update: src/Snow.sol:98

buySnow() also updates the same global timer:

  • src/Snow.sol:87

This allows attackers (or any active user) to repeatedly reset cooldown and deny others access to free weekly minting.

Exploit scenario:

  1. Victim expects to call earnSnow() once per week.

  2. Attacker calls buySnow() or earnSnow() first, resetting s_earnTimer.

  3. Victim’s call reverts with S__Timer().

PoC
Validated dynamically with Foundry test:

  • test/AuditFindings.t.sol::test_GlobalEarnTimerDoS

function test_GlobalEarnTimerDoS() public {
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
address victim = makeAddr("victim");
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks + 1);
vm.prank(attacker);
snow.earnSnow();
vm.prank(victim);
vm.expectRevert();
snow.earnSnow();
}

Impact

  • Denial of service against expected “weekly free Snow” functionality.

  • Unfair distribution and griefing vector.

  • Attackers can repeatedly lock out organic participants.

Tools Used

  • Foundry (forge test --match-contract AuditFindings)

  • Manual logic review

  • Temporal/state analysis

Recommendations
Track cooldown per address instead of globally.

Suggested patch:

contract Snow is ERC20, Ownable {
- uint256 private s_earnTimer;
+ mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
...
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
+ s_earnTimer[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
}
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
- if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
+ if (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
+ s_earnTimer[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 7 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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