Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Global s_earnTimer Allows Any User to Block All Others from Earning

Severity Critical
Confidence High
Likelihood High — occurs every time a second user calls earnSnow() within 1 week of the first caller; an attacker front-runs weekly to monopolize the free allocation
Impact Critical — only 1 Snow token per week is minted system-wide instead of 1 per user per week, breaking the entire token distribution model for the full 12-week farming duration
Scope Snow.earnSnow(), Snow.buySnow()
Status Confirmed (cross-validated)
File src/Snow.sol, lines 24, 91-95
Description
The Snow contract is designed to allow each user to earn 1 free Snow token per week via the earnSnow() function, with a 1-week cooldown enforced per user to prevent farming more than the intended rate.

The cooldown timer s_earnTimer is declared as a single global uint256 instead of a per-user mapping(address => uint256). When any user calls earnSnow(), it resets this shared timer, which blocks every other address from earning for the next 7 days. Only the first caller each week successfully earns; all subsequent callers revert with S__Timer.

// Snow.sol
@> uint256 private s_earnTimer; // global, not per-user

function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
@> if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
@> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // resets timer for ALL users
}
Risk
Likelihood:

Occurs every time any second user calls earnSnow() within 1 week of the first caller — this is the default usage pattern in a multi-user system
An attacker monitoring the mempool front-runs earnSnow() transactions each week to monopolize the free Snow allocation
Impact:

Only 1 Snow token per week is minted across the entire system instead of 1 per user per week, breaking the intended token distribution model
All users except the fastest front-runner lose gas on reverted transactions every week for the full 12-week farming duration
Proof of Concept

// test/TestGlobalEarnTimer.t.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;

import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {Snow} from "../src/Snow.sol";
import {MockWETH} from "../src/mock/MockWETH.sol";

contract TestGlobalEarnTimer is Test {
Snow snow;
MockWETH weth;
address collector = makeAddr("collector");

address alice = makeAddr("alice");
address bob = makeAddr("bob");

function setUp() public {
    weth = new MockWETH();
    snow = new Snow(address(weth), 5, collector);
}

function testGlobalTimerBlocksOtherUsers() public {
    // Alice earns first — succeeds
    vm.prank(alice);
    snow.earnSnow();
    assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 1);

    // Bob tries to earn immediately after Alice — REVERTS
    // because the GLOBAL s_earnTimer was just reset by Alice
    vm.prank(bob);
    vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
    snow.earnSnow();

    // Even after 6 days, Bob still cannot earn
    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 6 days);
    vm.prank(bob);
    vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
    snow.earnSnow();
}

function testOnlyOneEarnerPerWeek() public {
    // Week 1: Alice earns
    vm.prank(alice);
    snow.earnSnow();

    // Week 1: Bob is blocked
    vm.prank(bob);
    vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
    snow.earnSnow();

    // After exactly 1 week, someone can earn again
    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks);

    // Bob earns this week
    vm.prank(bob);
    snow.earnSnow();

    // Now Alice is blocked
    vm.prank(alice);
    vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
    snow.earnSnow();

    // After 12 weeks, only 2 Snow total were minted
    // (1 per week instead of 2 per week for 2 users)
    assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 1);
    assertEq(snow.balanceOf(bob), 1);
}

}
Recommended Mitigation

  • uint256 private s_earnTimer;

  • mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;

    function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {

  • if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
    
  • if (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] + 1 weeks)) {
        revert S__Timer();
    }
    _mint(msg.sender, 1);
    
  • s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
    
  • s_earnTimer[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
    

    }

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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