Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

[H] In buySnow, any purchase resets the global timer s_earnTimer, preventing other users from using the free earnSnow function for a week.

Root + Impact

Description

  • Any purchase resets the global s_earnTimer, causing earnSnow() to be denied at the protocol level. An attacker can call earnSnow first and then buySnow, preventing other users from minting for free.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
//....
@> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • The issue is easy to discover because s_earnTimer is a shared global state used by both buySnow() and earnSnow(). Any user can trigger it with a normal purchase and immediately reset the timer, blocking other users from earning Snow for 1 week. The attack requires no special setup and is trivial to repeat.


Impact: High

  • The shared s_earnTimer allows any purchase to reset the global earning cooldown, preventing other users from calling earnSnow() for 1 week. This breaks the intended free-mint mechanism and lets buyers grief or monopolize the weekly earn flow, causing a protocol-level denial of service for normal users.


Proof of Concept

A user first executes buySnow, then check whether the next user can execute earnSnow to receive tokens for free.

function test_Poc_CannotEarnSnowIfSomeoneBuysSnow() public {
//
vm.prank(ashley);
snow.earnSnow();
assert(snow.balanceOf(ashley) == 1);
vm.startPrank(jerry);
weth.approve(address(snow), FEE);
snow.buySnow(1); // This should reset the earn timer
vm.stopPrank();
vm.startPrank(ashley);
weth.approve(address(snow), FEE);
vm.expectRevert(); // Should revert because the earn timer was reset by jerry's purchase
snow.earnSnow();
vm.stopPrank();
}

Recommended Mitigation

Remove the `s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;`, buySnow should not refresh s_earnTimer; purchases are unrelated to s_earnTimer

function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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