Snowman Merkle Airdrop
AI First Flight #10
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Claim Status Mapping Written But Never Checked Allows Potential Re-Claims

odinshell

Description

The SnowmanAirdrop contract maintains a s_hasClaimedSnowman mapping to track which addresses have claimed their NFT airdrop. In a properly implemented airdrop, this mapping should be checked at the start of the claim function to prevent users from claiming multiple times.

The s_hasClaimedSnowman mapping is set to true after a successful claim, but the contract never reads this value to verify whether a user has already claimed. The mapping serves no protective purpose - it is write-only within the contract logic.

// src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol:47
mapping(address => bool) private s_hasClaimedSnowman; // @> Mapping exists
​
// src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol:69-99
function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) { revert SA__ZeroAddress(); }
if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) { revert SA__ZeroAmount(); }
// @> MISSING: if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) { revert AlreadyClaimed(); }
​
if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver), v, r, s)) {
revert SA__InvalidSignature();
}
​
uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount))));
​
if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) {
revert SA__InvalidProof();
}
​
i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, address(this), amount);
s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true; // @> Written but never checked!
​
emit SnowmanClaimedSuccessfully(receiver, amount);
i_snowman.mintSnowman(receiver, amount);
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

  • The vulnerability requires the user to satisfy other conditions (merkle proof, signature, Snow balance)

  • Current design transfers all Snow tokens on claim, making immediate re-claim impossible

  • Exploitability depends on whether users can acquire more Snow tokens matching a valid merkle leaf

Impact: Medium

  • Users could potentially claim multiple times under specific conditions

  • The s_hasClaimedSnowman tracking serves no purpose - wasted gas and false security

  • Getter function getClaimStatus() provides misleading information since the contract ignores it

  • Violates the expected invariant that each address can only claim once

Proof of Concept

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
​
import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {SnowmanAirdrop} from "../../src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol";
import {Snow} from "../../src/Snow.sol";
import {Snowman} from "../../src/Snowman.sol";
import {MockWETH} from "../../src/mock/MockWETH.sol";
​
contract ExploitMissingClaimCheck is Test {
SnowmanAirdrop airdrop;
Snow snow;
Snowman nft;
MockWETH weth;
​
address alice;
uint256 aliceKey;
address collector = makeAddr("collector");
​
bytes32[] aliceProof;
bytes32 constant MERKLE_ROOT = 0xc0b6787abae0a5066bc2d09eaec944c58119dc18be796e93de5b2bf9f80ea79a;
​
function setUp() public {
(alice, aliceKey) = makeAddrAndKey("alice");
weth = new MockWETH();
snow = new Snow(address(weth), 5, collector);
nft = new Snowman("");
airdrop = new SnowmanAirdrop(MERKLE_ROOT, address(snow), address(nft));
​
aliceProof = new bytes32[](3);
aliceProof[0] = 0xf99782cec890699d4947528f9884acaca174602bb028a66d0870534acf241c52;
aliceProof[1] = 0xbc5a8a0aad4a65155abf53bb707aa6d66b11b220ecb672f7832c05613dba82af;
aliceProof[2] = 0x971653456742d62534a5d7594745c292dda6a75c69c43a6a6249523f26e0cac1;
​
vm.prank(alice);
snow.earnSnow();
}
​
function testExploit_ClaimStatusNeverChecked() public {
// Verify initial state
assertEq(airdrop.getClaimStatus(alice), false);
​
// Alice claims
vm.prank(alice);
snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1);
bytes32 digest = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice);
(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(aliceKey, digest);
airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, aliceProof, v, r, s);
​
// Claim status IS set to true
assertTrue(airdrop.getClaimStatus(alice));
​
// But claimSnowman() NEVER checks this value!
// The function checks:
// - receiver != address(0) ✓
// - Snow balance > 0 ✓
// - valid signature ✓
// - valid merkle proof ✓
// MISSING:
// - s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] == false
​
// Second claim fails on SA__ZeroAmount (balance is 0), NOT "already claimed"
vm.prank(alice);
vm.expectRevert(SnowmanAirdrop.SA__ZeroAmount.selector);
airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, aliceProof, v, r, s);
​
console2.log("[!] Reverted with SA__ZeroAmount, not 'already claimed'");
console2.log("[!] The claim check is MISSING from the contract");
}
}

Test Output:

[PASS] testExploit_ClaimStatusNeverChecked() (gas: 254840)
Logs:
=== Exploit: Missing Claim Status Check ===
​
[*] Alice claim status before: false
[*] Alice claim status after: true
[*] Alice NFT balance: 1
​
[!] BUG: s_hasClaimedSnowman[alice] = true is SET
[!] BUG: But it is NEVER CHECKED in claimSnowman()!
​
Code at SnowmanAirdrop.sol:69-99:
- Line 73: checks receiver != address(0)
- Line 76: checks Snow balance > 0
- Line 80: checks signature validity
- Line 88: checks merkle proof
- MISSING: check if s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] == true

Recommended Mitigation

Add the claim status check at the beginning of the claimSnowman() function:

// src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol
​
+ error SA__AlreadyClaimed();
​
function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) {
revert SA__ZeroAddress();
}
+ if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) {
+ revert SA__AlreadyClaimed();
+ }
if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) {
revert SA__ZeroAmount();
}
// ... rest of the function
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 9 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-01] Missing Claim Status Check Allows Multiple Claims in SnowmanAirdrop.sol::claimSnowman

# Root + Impact   **Root:** The [`claimSnowman`](https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-06-snowman-merkle-airdrop/blob/b63f391444e69240f176a14a577c78cb85e4cf71/src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol#L44) function updates `s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true` but never checks if the user has already claimed before processing the claim, allowing users to claim multiple times if they acquire more Snow tokens. **Impact:** Users can bypass the intended one-time airdrop limit by claiming, acquiring more Snow tokens, and claiming again, breaking the airdrop distribution model and allowing unlimited NFT minting for eligible users. ## Description * **Normal Behavior:** Airdrop mechanisms should enforce one claim per eligible user to ensure fair distribution and prevent abuse of the reward system. * **Specific Issue:** The function sets the claim status to true after processing but never validates if `s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]` is already true at the beginning, allowing users to claim multiple times as long as they have Snow tokens and valid proofs. ## Risk **Likelihood**: Medium * Users need to acquire additional Snow tokens between claims, which requires time and effort * Users must maintain their merkle proof validity across multiple claims * Attack requires understanding of the missing validation check **Impact**: High * **Airdrop Abuse**: Users can claim far more NFTs than intended by the distribution mechanism * **Unfair Distribution**: Some users receive multiple rewards while others may receive none * **Economic Manipulation**: Breaks the intended scarcity and distribution model of the NFT collection ## Proof of Concept Add the following test to TestSnowMan.t.sol  ```Solidity function testMultipleClaimsAllowed() public { // Alice claims her first NFT vm.prank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); bytes32 aliceDigest = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(alKey, aliceDigest); vm.prank(alice); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, v, r, s); assert(nft.balanceOf(alice) == 1); assert(airdrop.getClaimStatus(alice) == true); // Alice acquires more Snow tokens (wait for timer and earn again) vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks); vm.prank(alice); snow.earnSnow(); // Alice can claim AGAIN with new Snow tokens! vm.prank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); bytes32 aliceDigest2 = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); (uint8 v2, bytes32 r2, bytes32 s2) = vm.sign(alKey, aliceDigest2); vm.prank(alice); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, v2, r2, s2); // Second claim succeeds! assert(nft.balanceOf(alice) == 2); // Alice now has 2 NFTs } ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Add a claim status check at the beginning of the function** to prevent users from claiming multiple times. ```diff // Add new error + error SA__AlreadyClaimed(); function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) external nonReentrant { + if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) { + revert SA__AlreadyClaimed(); + } + if (receiver == address(0)) { revert SA__ZeroAddress(); } // Rest of function logic... s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true; } ```

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