Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Snow::s_earnTimer is a single global timer instead of per-user mapping, breaking the documented once-a-week-per-user earn semantics and enabling permanent DoS of earnSnow via buySnow spam

Description

The README documents the earn mechanism as "The Snow token can either be earned for free once a week", strongly implying a per-user weekly entitlement.

However, s_earnTimer is declared as a single uint256 state variable, not a mapping(address => uint256). It is updated globally on both buySnow (line 87) and earnSnow (line 98). As a result,
only one user can call earnSnow() per week across the entire protocol, and any user can call buySnow(amount=0) with msg.value=0 (no cost, mints zero Snow) to reset s_earnTimer = block.timestamp,
locking earnSnow for the next week. An attacker can spam buySnow(0) at gas-only cost, permanently DoS-ing the entire free-earn feature.

// src/Snow.sol
@> uint256 private s_earnTimer; // SINGLE GLOBAL TIMER (should be mapping per user)
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) {
_mint(msg.sender, amount);
} else {
i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount));
_mint(msg.sender, amount);
}
@> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // updated globally
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
@> if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
@> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The DoS attack vector is permissionless; any EOA can call buySnow(0) with no ETH and no WETH approval, since safeTransferFrom(_,_,0) is a no-op on most ERC20s.

  • The "once a week" semantic breaks the moment a second legitimate user calls earnSnow after the first; this triggers on every legitimate use.

Impact:

  • The documented free-earn distribution channel is broken; only one address per week earns globally.

  • Combined with the 12-week FARMING_DURATION, the maximum supply of free-earned Snow tokens is ~12 instead of N_users × 12.

  • An attacker griefing buySnow(0) permanently denies all other users access to the free distribution channel.

Proof of Concept

The first test below shows that Alice's legitimate earnSnow call blocks Bob from earning for a full week, contradicting the documented per-user semantics. The second test demonstrates the cost-free
DoS: an attacker calls buySnow(0) with zero ETH, mints zero Snow, but updates the global timer, blocking every other user's earnSnow for a week. Repeated weekly (or more frequently) this permanently
disables the free-earn channel.

function test_global_timer_blocks_other_users() public {
address alice = makeAddr("alice");
address bob = makeAddr("bob");
vm.prank(alice);
snow.earnSnow();
assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 1);
vm.prank(bob);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow(); // Bob blocked — timer should be per-user
}
function test_buySnow_zero_amount_dos() public {
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
address legitUser = makeAddr("legitUser");
vm.prank(attacker);
snow.buySnow{value: 0}(0); // mints 0 Snow, updates global timer at zero cost
vm.prank(legitUser);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow();
}

Both tests pass against the deployed contract, confirming the global-timer flaw and the zero-cost griefing attack surface.

Recommended Mitigation

Convert s_earnTimer to a per-user mapping so each address's cooldown is tracked independently. Additionally, reject zero-amount buySnow calls outright, and remove the global s_earnTimer = block.timestamp write from buySnow — buying Snow should not affect free-earn cooldowns since they are independent distribution channels.

- uint256 private s_earnTimer;
+ mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
- if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
+ if (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer[msg.sender] + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
+ s_earnTimer[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
}
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
+ if (amount == 0) revert S__ZeroValue();
if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); }
else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); }
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}

After this fix, each user has their own weekly earn cooldown, and the buySnow(0) DoS vector is closed by the explicit zero-amount revert.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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