The README documents the earn mechanism as "The Snow token can either be earned for free once a week", strongly implying a per-user weekly entitlement.
However, s_earnTimer is declared as a single uint256 state variable, not a mapping(address => uint256). It is updated globally on both buySnow (line 87) and earnSnow (line 98). As a result,
only one user can call earnSnow() per week across the entire protocol, and any user can call buySnow(amount=0) with msg.value=0 (no cost, mints zero Snow) to reset s_earnTimer = block.timestamp,
locking earnSnow for the next week. An attacker can spam buySnow(0) at gas-only cost, permanently DoS-ing the entire free-earn feature.
Likelihood:
The DoS attack vector is permissionless; any EOA can call buySnow(0) with no ETH and no WETH approval, since safeTransferFrom(_,_,0) is a no-op on most ERC20s.
The "once a week" semantic breaks the moment a second legitimate user calls earnSnow after the first; this triggers on every legitimate use.
Impact:
The documented free-earn distribution channel is broken; only one address per week earns globally.
Combined with the 12-week FARMING_DURATION, the maximum supply of free-earned Snow tokens is ~12 instead of N_users × 12.
An attacker griefing buySnow(0) permanently denies all other users access to the free distribution channel.
The first test below shows that Alice's legitimate earnSnow call blocks Bob from earning for a full week, contradicting the documented per-user semantics. The second test demonstrates the cost-free
DoS: an attacker calls buySnow(0) with zero ETH, mints zero Snow, but updates the global timer, blocking every other user's earnSnow for a week. Repeated weekly (or more frequently) this permanently
disables the free-earn channel.
Both tests pass against the deployed contract, confirming the global-timer flaw and the zero-cost griefing attack surface.
Convert s_earnTimer to a per-user mapping so each address's cooldown is tracked independently. Additionally, reject zero-amount buySnow calls outright, and remove the global s_earnTimer = block.timestamp write from buySnow — buying Snow should not affect free-earn cooldowns since they are independent distribution channels.
After this fix, each user has their own weekly earn cooldown, and the buySnow(0) DoS vector is closed by the explicit zero-amount revert.
## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```
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