Normal behavior: EIP-712 requires the type hash to exactly match the struct definition. MESSAGE_TYPEHASH should encode SnowmanClaim(address receiver, uint256 amount).
The issue: Line 49 of SnowmanAirdrop.sol contains a critical typo — addres instead of address. Every signature generated off-chain using the correct type string hashes to a different digest than what the contract computes, causing _isValidSignature() to always return false. The airdrop is completely non-functional from deployment.
Likelihood:
This is a compile-time constant. The typo is baked into the contract permanently at deployment with a 100% failure rate on every signature verification call.
Every single user attempting to claim via signature receives SA__InvalidSignature with no workaround available.
Impact:
The entire airdrop signature mechanism is broken, no user can claim via signature.
The contract cannot be fixed without redeployment, all deployed instances are permanently broken.
The following Foundry test proves that off-chain and on-chain type hashes diverge due to the typo. Both hashes are computed and asserted unequal, confirming that any signature generated by standard EIP-712 tooling will never match what the contract verifies. claimSnowman() always reverts with SA__InvalidSignature for every user.
The fix is a single character correction to the type string constant. Because MESSAGE_TYPEHASH is immutable at deployment, the contract must be redeployed. No other changes are required, the corrected hash automatically aligns with signatures generated by any standard EIP-712 compliant wallet or library. A regression test verifying the hash on every deployment is strongly recommended.
# Root + Impact ## Description * Little typo on `MESSAGE_TYPEHASH` Declaration on `SnowmanAirdrop` contract ```Solidity // src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol 49: bytes32 private constant MESSAGE_TYPEHASH = keccak256("SnowmanClaim(addres receiver, uint256 amount)"); ``` **Impact**: * `function claimSnowman` never be `TRUE` condition ## Proof of Concept Applying this function at the end of /test/TestSnowmanAirdrop.t.sol to know what the correct and wrong digest output HASH. Ran with command: `forge test --match-test testFrontendSignatureVerification -vvvv` ```Solidity function testFrontendSignatureVerification() public { // Setup Alice for the test vm.startPrank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); vm.stopPrank(); // Simulate frontend using the correct format bytes32 FRONTEND_MESSAGE_TYPEHASH = keccak256("SnowmanClaim(address receiver, uint256 amount)"); // Domain separator used by frontend (per EIP-712) bytes32 DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = keccak256( abi.encode( keccak256("EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)"), keccak256("Snowman Airdrop"), keccak256("1"), block.chainid, address(airdrop) ) ); // Get Alice's token amount uint256 amount = snow.balanceOf(alice); // Frontend creates hash using the correct format bytes32 structHash = keccak256( abi.encode( FRONTEND_MESSAGE_TYPEHASH, alice, amount ) ); // Frontend creates the final digest (per EIP-712) bytes32 frontendDigest = keccak256( abi.encodePacked( "\x19\x01", DOMAIN_SEPARATOR, structHash ) ); // Alice signs the digest created by the frontend (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(alKey, frontendDigest); // Digest created by the contract (with typo) bytes32 contractDigest = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); // Display both digests for comparison console2.log("Frontend Digest (correct format):"); console2.logBytes32(frontendDigest); console2.log("Contract Digest (with typo):"); console2.logBytes32(contractDigest); // Compare the digests - they should differ due to the typo assertFalse( frontendDigest == contractDigest, "Digests should differ due to typo in MESSAGE_TYPEHASH" ); // Attempt to claim with the signature - should fail vm.prank(satoshi); vm.expectRevert(SnowmanAirdrop.SA__InvalidSignature.selector); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, v, r, s); assertEq(nft.balanceOf(alice), 0); } ``` ## Recommended Mitigation on contract `SnowmanAirdrop` Line 49 applying this: ```diff - bytes32 private constant MESSAGE_TYPEHASH = keccak256("SnowmanClaim(addres receiver, uint256 amount)"); + bytes32 private constant MESSAGE_TYPEHASH = keccak256("SnowmanClaim(address receiver, uint256 amount)"); ```
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