Snowman Merkle Airdrop
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

getClaimStatus` Returns True After First Claim but the Same Address Can Claim Again — Public Interface Lies About Internal State

mrqaqasec

Description

The intended behavior of the s_hasClaimedSnowman mapping and its public getter getClaimStatus is to expose a definitive boolean: true means the address has claimed and cannot claim again, false means the address has not claimed and is still eligible. Any external system (dashboard, governance module, secondary-market verifier, snapshot tool) that reads this getter is entitled to trust that the boolean reflects an enforced claim state.

The specific issue is that s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] is written to true at the end of claimSnowman but is NEVER read as a guard inside claimSnowman. Combined with the balance-dependent leaf computation (H-03), this means an address that has already claimed can re-acquire Snow tokens (via earnSnow() or buySnow()) and claim again — the same Merkle proof still verifies, a fresh signature is produced, the mapping write is idempotent (already true), and the claim succeeds. getClaimStatus returns true throughout: once after the first claim, again after the second claim, again after the third. There is no observable difference between a state with N=1 claims and a state with N=2 claims for the same address.

// SnowmanAirdrop.sol — claimSnowman()
function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) revert SA__ZeroAddress();
if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
​
// @> No guard: there is no `if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) revert SA__AlreadyClaimed();`
if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver), v, r, s))
revert SA__InvalidSignature();
​
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount))));
if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) revert SA__InvalidProof();
​
i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, i_tokenCollector, amount);
​
// @> The mapping is WRITTEN here but NEVER READ as a precondition above.
// @> After a second successful claim this write is a no-op (already true), so the
// @> getter cannot distinguish "claimed once" from "claimed N times".
s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true;
​
emit SnowmanClaimedSuccessfully(receiver, amount);
i_snowman.mintSnowman(receiver, amount);
}
​
function getClaimStatus(address claimant) external view returns (bool) {
return s_hasClaimedSnowman[claimant]; // @> reports "claimed" even when N>1 claims occurred
}

Risk

Likelihood:

Reason 1: The re-claim path is exercised by any whitelisted user who calls earnSnow() (free, subject only to a shared global 1-week timer) or buySnow() (paid) after their first claim. Within the 12-week farming window, re-claiming is free and has a 1-week cadence.

Reason 2: The misleading getClaimStatus return value appears in 100% of post-claim states — there is no configuration or edge case in which the getter behaves correctly after a re-claim. Any external system that consumes this getter is affected whenever a re-claim has occurred.

Impact:

Impact 1: External systems that rely on getClaimStatus for business logic — e.g., a governance contract that grants one vote per claimer, a dashboard that reports airdrop completion as claimedCount / totalWhitelisted, a secondary-market listing that requires getClaimStatus == true as proof of claim — receive false data. The reported state diverges silently from the actual on-chain state.

Impact 2: The misalignment between the public interface (which advertises an enforced claim flag) and the internal logic (which does not enforce it) is a trust violation. Users and integrators who read the contract source and see the s_hasClaimedSnowman mapping plus its public getter will reasonably assume the flag is enforced. The trust assumption is broken without any on-chain signal, making the failure mode silent and hard to detect.

Proof of Concept

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
​
import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {Snow} from "../src/Snow.sol";
import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol";
import {SnowmanAirdrop} from "../src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol";
import {MockWETH} from "../src/mock/MockWETH.sol";
import {Merkle} from "murky/src/Merkle.sol";
​
contract M04_ClaimStatus is Test {
Snow public snow;
Snowman public snowman;
MockWETH public weth;
Merkle public merkleLib;
​
address public alice;
uint256 public aliceKey;
​
function setUp() public {
merkleLib = new Merkle();
(alice, aliceKey) = makeAddrAndKey("alice");
weth = new MockWETH();
snow = new Snow(address(weth), 5, makeAddr("collector"));
snowman = new Snowman("");
vm.prank(alice); snow.earnSnow();
}
​
function _leaf(address a, uint256 amt) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(a, amt))));
}
​
function _claim(SnowmanAirdrop a, address who, uint256 key, bytes32[] memory proof) internal {
vm.prank(who); snow.approve(address(a), type(uint256).max);
bytes32 digest = a.getMessageHash(who);
(uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(key, digest);
a.claimSnowman(who, proof, v, r, s);
}
​
function test_getClaimStatusMisleadingAfterReclaim() public {
bytes32[] memory leaves = new bytes32[](1);
leaves[0] = _leaf(alice, 1);
bytes32 root = merkleLib.getRoot(leaves);
bytes32[] memory proof = merkleLib.getProof(leaves, 0);
SnowmanAirdrop a = new SnowmanAirdrop(root, address(snow), address(snowman));
​
// First claim.
_claim(a, alice, aliceKey, proof);
assertTrue(a.getClaimStatus(alice)); // true
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(alice), 1);
​
// Alice re-acquires Snow after the 1-week timer.
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks);
vm.prank(alice); snow.earnSnow();
assertEq(snow.balanceOf(alice), 1);
​
// Status STILL reports "claimed" — but the next claim succeeds anyway.
assertTrue(a.getClaimStatus(alice));
​
_claim(a, alice, aliceKey, proof);
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(alice), 2); // 2 NFTs minted to Alice
​
// The getter cannot distinguish the "1 claim" state from the "2 claims" state.
assertTrue(a.getClaimStatus(alice)); // identical to post-first-claim state
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

Either enforce the flag inside claimSnowman, or remove the misleading getter. The preferred fix is to enforce the flag — this also closes the underlying multi-claim path that depends on the same root cause.

// SnowmanAirdrop.sol — claimSnowman()
function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s)
external
nonReentrant
{
if (receiver == address(0)) revert SA__ZeroAddress();
if (i_snow.balanceOf(receiver) == 0) revert SA__ZeroAmount();
+ if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) revert SA__AlreadyClaimed();
uint256 amount = i_snow.balanceOf(receiver);
​
if (!_isValidSignature(receiver, getMessageHash(receiver), v, r, s))
revert SA__InvalidSignature();
​
bytes32 leaf = keccak256(bytes.concat(keccak256(abi.encode(receiver, amount))));
if (!MerkleProof.verify(merkleProof, i_merkleRoot, leaf)) revert SA__InvalidProof();
​
i_snow.safeTransferFrom(receiver, i_tokenCollector, amount);
s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true;
emit SnowmanClaimedSuccessfully(receiver, amount);
i_snowman.mintSnowman(receiver, amount);
}

Adding the explicit SA__AlreadyClaimed guard makes the public getter's contract truthful: once getClaimStatus returns true, the address can never claim again. If for any reason the project wants to keep the multi-claim path (e.g., per-round claims), the getter should be removed or renamed to hasAtLeastOneClaim so it cannot be misread as an enforced eligibility flag.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-01] Missing Claim Status Check Allows Multiple Claims in SnowmanAirdrop.sol::claimSnowman

# Root + Impact   **Root:** The [`claimSnowman`](https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-06-snowman-merkle-airdrop/blob/b63f391444e69240f176a14a577c78cb85e4cf71/src/SnowmanAirdrop.sol#L44) function updates `s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true` but never checks if the user has already claimed before processing the claim, allowing users to claim multiple times if they acquire more Snow tokens. **Impact:** Users can bypass the intended one-time airdrop limit by claiming, acquiring more Snow tokens, and claiming again, breaking the airdrop distribution model and allowing unlimited NFT minting for eligible users. ## Description * **Normal Behavior:** Airdrop mechanisms should enforce one claim per eligible user to ensure fair distribution and prevent abuse of the reward system. * **Specific Issue:** The function sets the claim status to true after processing but never validates if `s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]` is already true at the beginning, allowing users to claim multiple times as long as they have Snow tokens and valid proofs. ## Risk **Likelihood**: Medium * Users need to acquire additional Snow tokens between claims, which requires time and effort * Users must maintain their merkle proof validity across multiple claims * Attack requires understanding of the missing validation check **Impact**: High * **Airdrop Abuse**: Users can claim far more NFTs than intended by the distribution mechanism * **Unfair Distribution**: Some users receive multiple rewards while others may receive none * **Economic Manipulation**: Breaks the intended scarcity and distribution model of the NFT collection ## Proof of Concept Add the following test to TestSnowMan.t.sol  ```Solidity function testMultipleClaimsAllowed() public { // Alice claims her first NFT vm.prank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); bytes32 aliceDigest = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(alKey, aliceDigest); vm.prank(alice); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, v, r, s); assert(nft.balanceOf(alice) == 1); assert(airdrop.getClaimStatus(alice) == true); // Alice acquires more Snow tokens (wait for timer and earn again) vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1 weeks); vm.prank(alice); snow.earnSnow(); // Alice can claim AGAIN with new Snow tokens! vm.prank(alice); snow.approve(address(airdrop), 1); bytes32 aliceDigest2 = airdrop.getMessageHash(alice); (uint8 v2, bytes32 r2, bytes32 s2) = vm.sign(alKey, aliceDigest2); vm.prank(alice); airdrop.claimSnowman(alice, AL_PROOF, v2, r2, s2); // Second claim succeeds! assert(nft.balanceOf(alice) == 2); // Alice now has 2 NFTs } ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Add a claim status check at the beginning of the function** to prevent users from claiming multiple times. ```diff // Add new error + error SA__AlreadyClaimed(); function claimSnowman(address receiver, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) external nonReentrant { + if (s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver]) { + revert SA__AlreadyClaimed(); + } + if (receiver == address(0)) { revert SA__ZeroAddress(); } // Rest of function logic... s_hasClaimedSnowman[receiver] = true; } ```

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