Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Global earn timer enables permanent, free denial of service

Root + Impact

Description

  • The weekly-cooldown timer is declared as a single global variable rather than per-address (mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;). Both buySnow and earnSnow write to it:

  • uint256 private s_earnTimer;

  • Because there is only one timer for the entire contract, one address calling either function resets the cooldown for every other address, whether or not they have ever called earnSnow themselves.
    Compounding this, buySnow has no minimum-amount check, and its equality check accepts amount = 0

function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
...
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // resets the ONE global clock
}
​
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}
​
if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { // 0 == s_buyFee * 0 → true
_mint(msg.sender, amount); // mints 0 tokens
}
...
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // still resets the global timer
​
​
// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Directly leads to loss or lock of user/protocol funds, or a permanent, low-cost denial of core functionality, exploitable by any user under normal conditions.

Impact:

  • Any address can call buySnow(0) with msg.value = 0 — a free, always-successful call — and reset the global cooldown. Repeating this roughly once per block indefinitely means earnSnow() can be permanently denied to the entire user base for the cost of gas alone. This defeats the "earn for free once a week" mechanic described in the project's own documentation.

Proof of Concept

Attacker calls `buySnow(0)` (no ETH, no WETH approval needed).
`s_earnTimer` is set to `block.timestamp`.
Any user calling `earnSnow()` now reverts with `S__Timer` for the next week.
Attacker repeats step 1 before the week elapses. `earnSnow()` never becomes callable again, for anyone, for as long as the attacker chooses.
​

Recommended Mitigation

Make the timer per-user: `mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;`, read/write `s_earnTimer[msg.sender]`.
Add a zero-amount guard to `buySnow`: `if (amount == 0) revert S__ZeroValue();`.
Consider whether `buySnow` should touch the earn-timer at all — the documentation describes earning and buying as two separate mechanisms; conflating their cooldowns appears unintentional.
​
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 12 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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