Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

s_earnTimer global variable causes Denial of Service for earnSnow and cross-function lockout

Description

Formatted / Raw:

The earnSnow function is intended to allow users to claim a free Snow token once every week by checking s_earnTimer against block.timestamp.

However, s_earnTimer is stored as a single global uint256 state variable across the entire contract instead of tracking cooldowns per user address. Furthermore, s_earnTimer is updated inside both earnSnow and buySnow. This allows any user interacting with earnSnow or buySnow to reset the 1-week clock for all other protocol users, locking them out of claiming free tokens.

// Root cause in t// @> Global state variable shared across all users
uint256 private s_earnTimer;
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
// ... logic ...
// @> Every token purchase resets the global earn timer for all users
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
// @> Checks global timer against current time
if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
// @> Updates global timer for all users
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}he codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section

Risk

Likelihood:

  • A single user calling earnSnow sets s_earnTimer = block.timestamp, forcing all other users on the network to wait 1 week.

  • Regular users buying tokens via buySnow reset s_earnTimer continuously, ensuring the 1-week cooldown never elapses.

Impact:

  • Complete Denial of Service (DoS) for legitimate users attempting to use earnSnow.

  • Griefing vector where an attacker or regular activity permanently blocks the faucet mechanism.

Proof of Concept

Proof of Concept Explanation:
The following Foundry test demonstrates how a single interaction blocks all other users and how subsequent purchases reset the global timer.
1) userA calls earnSnow(), setting s_earnTimer.
2) userB immediately attempts to call earnSnow() and reverts with S__Timer().
3) After 4 days, userC calls buySnow(), resetting s_earnTimer to the new timestamp.
4) Even after 8 total days pass since userA's call, userB remains locked out because userC's purchase reset the global timer.function test_s_earnTimer_globalDoS() public {
// User A claims free snow
vm.prank(userA);
snow.earnSnow();
// User B attempts to claim immediately after and gets reverted
vm.prank(userB);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow();
// 4 days pass
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 4 days);
// User C buys snow, which resets s_earnTimer back to block.timestamp
vm.prank(userC);
snow.buySnow{value: 1 ether}(1);
// 4 more days pass (8 days since User A claimed, > 1 week)
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 4 days);
// User B tries to claim again, but is still blocked because User C's buy reset the clock
vm.prank(userB);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow();
}

Recommended Mitigation

Mitigation Explanation:
1) Change s_earnTimer from a single uint256 state variable to a mapping: mapping(address => uint256) private s_userEarnTimer.
2) Update earnSnow() to read and set cooldown timestamps exclusively for msg.sender.
3) Remove s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; entirely from buySnow() so purchasing tokens no longer resets the free faucet timer.
+ mapping(address => uint256) private s_userEarnTimer;
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) {
_mint(msg.sender, amount);
} else {
i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount));
_mint(msg.sender, amount);
}
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
- if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
+ if (s_userEarnTimer[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_userEarnTimer[msg.sender] + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
+ s_userEarnTimer[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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