Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Snowman.mintSnowman lacks access control allowing anyone to mint arbitrary NFTs and bypass staking and Merkle airdrop

Description

Normal behavior: Snowman should serve as an NFT asset that users receive only after successfully staking Snow in SnowmanAirdrop (validating Merkle proof + EIP-712 signature). mintSnowman should be restricted to that flow (onlyOwner or exclusive access to SnowmanAirdrop).

Specific issue: Snowman inherits Ownable but mintSnowman is external and lacks any access modifier. Anyone can call it directly to mint any quantity of NFTs to any address without staking Snow or possessing a Merkle proof. Recommended Mitigation Explanation

The mintSnowman function currently lacks any access control modifier, allowing any external caller to mint an unlimited number of Snowman NFTs to any address. This completely bypasses the intended protocol flow where NFTs should only be distributed through the SnowmanAirdrop contract after users stake Snow tokens and validate their Merkle proof. ...without staking Snow or possessing a Merkle proof.

## Recommended Mitigation
​
The `mintSnowman` function currently lacks any access control modifier, allowing any external caller to mint an unlimited number of `Snowman` NFTs to any address. This completely bypasses the intended protocol flow where NFTs should only be distributed through the `SnowmanAirdrop` contract after users stake `Snow` tokens and validate their Merkle proof.
​
To fix this vulnerability, the `onlyOwner` modifier from the inherited `Ownable` contract should be added to the `mintSnowman` function. This ensures that only the deployer/owner of the contract can mint NFTs, preserving the economic integrity of the protocol.
​
If the `SnowmanAirdrop` contract needs to mint NFTs on behalf of users, the access control should be extended to also allow calls from the `SnowmanAirdrop` contract address using a custom modifier or OpenZeppelin's `AccessControl` with a `MINTER_ROLE`.
// Snowman.sol
// @> function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external {
// @> for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
// @> _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
// @> s_TokenCounter++;
// @> }
// @> }## Recommended Mitigation Explanation
​
// Snowman.sol
// @> function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external {
// @> for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
// @> _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
// @> s_TokenCounter++;
// @> }
// @> }
// Snowman.sol
function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { // @> Missing onlyOwner modifier
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
_safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
s_TokenCounter++;
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • A direct call from any EOA is sufficient; no additional conditions exist.

  • The mint function is public at the same level as any other function.

Impact:

  • Free and unlimited minting of Snowman NFTs without staking, adulterating the protocol's economy.

  • Falsification of the utility associated with Snow staking.

Proof of Concept

The following test demonstrates that any address (not just the owner) can call mintSnowman to mint arbitrary amounts of NFTs without any staking or Merkle proof validation.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
​
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "../src/Snowman.sol";
​
contract PoC_MintSnowmanNoAccessControl is Test {
Snowman public snowman;
address public attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
function setUp() public {
snowman = new Snowman();
}
function test_AnyoneCanMintSnowman() public {
// Attacker (not owner) can mint freely
vm.prank(attacker);
snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 3);
// Attacker successfully minted 3 NFTs
assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 3);
assertEq(snowman.ownerOf(0), attacker);
assertEq(snowman.ownerOf(1), attacker);
assertEq(snowman.ownerOf(2), attacker);
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

​
​
### **Recommended Mitigation (campo diff):**
​
```diff
- uint256 private s_earnTimer;
+ mapping(address => uint256) private s_earnTimer;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Unrestricted NFT Minting in Snowman.sol

# Root + Impact ## Description * The Snowman NFT contract is designed to mint NFTs through a controlled airdrop mechanism where only authorized entities should be able to create new tokens for eligible recipients. * The `mintSnowman()` function lacks any access control mechanisms, allowing any external address to call the function and mint unlimited NFTs to any recipient without authorization, completely bypassing the intended airdrop distribution model. ```Solidity // Root cause in the codebase function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { @> // NO ACCESS CONTROL - Any address can call this function for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } @> // NO VALIDATION - No checks on amount or caller authorization } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: * The vulnerability will be exploited as soon as any malicious actor discovers the contract address, since the function is publicly accessible with no restrictions * Automated scanning tools and MEV bots continuously monitor new contract deployments for exploitable functions, making discovery inevitable **Impact**: * Complete destruction of tokenomics through unlimited supply inflation, rendering all legitimate NFTs worthless * Total compromise of the airdrop mechanism, allowing attackers to mint millions of tokens and undermine the project's credibility and economic model ## Proof of Concept ```Solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.24; import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol"; contract SnowmanExploitPoC is Test { Snowman public snowman; address public attacker = makeAddr("attacker"); string constant SVG_URI = ""; function setUp() public { snowman = new Snowman(SVG_URI); } function testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() public { console2.log("=== UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT ==="); console2.log("Initial token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance before:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // EXPLOIT: Anyone can mint unlimited NFTs vm.prank(attacker); snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000); // Mint 1K NFTs console2.log("Final token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance after:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // Verify exploit success assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 1000); assertEq(snowman.getTokenCounter(), 1000); console2.log(" EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization"); } } ``` <br /> PoC Results: ```Solidity forge test --match-test testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting -vv [⠑] Compiling... [⠢] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.29 [⠰] Solc 0.8.29 finished in 1.45s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/SnowmanExploitPoC.t.sol:SnowmanExploitPoC [PASS] testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() (gas: 26868041) Logs: === UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT === Initial token counter: 0 Attacker balance before: 0 Final token counter: 1000 Attacker balance after: 1000 EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.28ms (3.58ms CPU time) Ran 1 test suite in 10.15ms (4.28ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests) ``` ## Recommended Mitigation Adding the `onlyOwner` modifier restricts the `mintSnowman()` function to only be callable by the contract owner, preventing unauthorized addresses from minting NFTs. ```diff - function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { + function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } } ```

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