Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Snowman::mintSnowman lacks access control — anyone can mint unlimited Snowman NFTs, bypassing the entire Merkle airdrop

Root + Impact

Description

Normal behavior: Snowman NFTs are meant to be distributed exclusively through SnowmanAirdrop::claimSnowman, which requires the receiver to own Snow tokens, be included in the on-chain Merkle tree, and provide a valid EIP-712 signature.

Issue: Snowman::mintSnowman is declared external with no access-control modifier of any kind. The contract inherits Ownable but never uses onlyOwner, and no allowlist of minters exists. Any address can therefore mint an arbitrary number of NFTs to any receiver, directly and for free.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
contract Snowman is ERC721, Ownable {
// @> Ownable is inherited but no guard is ever applied to mintSnowman
function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
_safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
s_TokenCounter++;
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Any address can call mintSnowman at any time — no staking, no Merkle proof, no signature, no fee. MEV bots scanning new deployments will find the unprotected mint immediately.

Impact:

  • Complete bypass of the airdrop model: NFT scarcity and the staking reward mechanism are destroyed, as unlimited NFTs can be minted for free, indistinguishable from legitimately claimed ones.

  • The Merkle tree, EIP-712 signature flow, and Snow-token staking in SnowmanAirdrop all become security theater — the intended gating provides zero actual protection.

Proof of Concept

The following Foundry test shows an attacker with no Snow tokens, no Merkle inclusion and no signature minting 1000 NFTs in one call. Run with forge test --match-test test_F1_UnpermissionedMint -vv.

function test_F1_UnpermissionedMint() public {
assertEq(nft.balanceOf(attacker), 0);
vm.prank(attacker);
nft.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000); // no SNOW, no proof, no signature
assertEq(nft.balanceOf(attacker), 1000);
assertEq(nft.ownerOf(999), attacker);
}

Result: PASS — the attacker holds 1000 NFTs that are identical to claimed ones, without ever touching the airdrop contract.

Recommended Mitigation

Restrict minting to the airdrop contract by transferring Ownable ownership to SnowmanAirdrop and adding the guard:

+ import {Ownable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol";
​
contract Snowman is ERC721, Ownable {
+ error SM__NotAirdrop();
+
+ modifier onlyAirdrop() {
+ if (msg.sender != owner()) revert SM__NotAirdrop();
+ _;
+ }
+
- function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external {
+ function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external onlyAirdrop {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) {
_safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter);
s_TokenCounter++;
}
}
}

and in the deployment sequence: snowman.transferOwnership(address(airdrop));

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Unrestricted NFT Minting in Snowman.sol

# Root + Impact ## Description * The Snowman NFT contract is designed to mint NFTs through a controlled airdrop mechanism where only authorized entities should be able to create new tokens for eligible recipients. * The `mintSnowman()` function lacks any access control mechanisms, allowing any external address to call the function and mint unlimited NFTs to any recipient without authorization, completely bypassing the intended airdrop distribution model. ```Solidity // Root cause in the codebase function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { @> // NO ACCESS CONTROL - Any address can call this function for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } @> // NO VALIDATION - No checks on amount or caller authorization } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: * The vulnerability will be exploited as soon as any malicious actor discovers the contract address, since the function is publicly accessible with no restrictions * Automated scanning tools and MEV bots continuously monitor new contract deployments for exploitable functions, making discovery inevitable **Impact**: * Complete destruction of tokenomics through unlimited supply inflation, rendering all legitimate NFTs worthless * Total compromise of the airdrop mechanism, allowing attackers to mint millions of tokens and undermine the project's credibility and economic model ## Proof of Concept ```Solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.24; import {Test, console2} from "forge-std/Test.sol"; import {Snowman} from "../src/Snowman.sol"; contract SnowmanExploitPoC is Test { Snowman public snowman; address public attacker = makeAddr("attacker"); string constant SVG_URI = ""; function setUp() public { snowman = new Snowman(SVG_URI); } function testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() public { console2.log("=== UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT ==="); console2.log("Initial token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance before:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // EXPLOIT: Anyone can mint unlimited NFTs vm.prank(attacker); snowman.mintSnowman(attacker, 1000); // Mint 1K NFTs console2.log("Final token counter:", snowman.getTokenCounter()); console2.log("Attacker balance after:", snowman.balanceOf(attacker)); // Verify exploit success assertEq(snowman.balanceOf(attacker), 1000); assertEq(snowman.getTokenCounter(), 1000); console2.log(" EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization"); } } ``` <br /> PoC Results: ```Solidity forge test --match-test testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting -vv [⠑] Compiling... [⠢] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.29 [⠰] Solc 0.8.29 finished in 1.45s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/SnowmanExploitPoC.t.sol:SnowmanExploitPoC [PASS] testExploit_UnrestrictedMinting() (gas: 26868041) Logs: === UNRESTRICTED MINTING EXPLOIT === Initial token counter: 0 Attacker balance before: 0 Final token counter: 1000 Attacker balance after: 1000 EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Minted 1K NFTs without authorization Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 4.28ms (3.58ms CPU time) Ran 1 test suite in 10.15ms (4.28ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests) ``` ## Recommended Mitigation Adding the `onlyOwner` modifier restricts the `mintSnowman()` function to only be callable by the contract owner, preventing unauthorized addresses from minting NFTs. ```diff - function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external { + function mintSnowman(address receiver, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner { for (uint256 i = 0; i < amount; i++) { _safeMint(receiver, s_TokenCounter); emit SnowmanMinted(receiver, s_TokenCounter); s_TokenCounter++; } } ```

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