Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Global s_earnTimer lets anyone permanently DoS earnSnow for all users at zero cost via buySnow(0)

Root + Impact

Description

Normal behavior: earnSnow is the free faucet: each user should be able to mint 1 Snow token per week. Cooldowns for per-user actions must be tracked per address.

Issue: s_earnTimer is a single contract-wide slot, not a per-user mapping, and it is overwritten by both earnSnow and buySnow. Because s_buyFee * 0 == 0, buySnow{value: 0}(0) is a free no-op mint that still executes the timer write. One address can therefore reset the earn cooldown for the entire protocol every week, indefinitely, at zero cost.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
uint256 private s_earnTimer; // @> global, not per-user
​
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) {
_mint(msg.sender, amount); // @> buySnow(0) with 0 ETH mints nothing, costs nothing
} else {
i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount));
_mint(msg.sender, amount);
}
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // @> every purchase resets the faucet for EVERYONE
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}
​
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Occurs by default with more than one user: the first earnSnow caller each week blocks everyone else for 7 days. A deliberate attacker repeats buySnow{value:0}(0) weekly (or fronts every pending earnSnow in the mempool) at zero cost.

Impact:

  • The free weekly-earn distribution — the primary onboarding path for non-buyers and the way Merkle-eligible users re-fill their balance — can be kept permanently offline by a single griefer spending only gas.

Proof of Concept

The following Foundry test shows an attacker resetting the global timer every 6 days, keeping Alice locked out of earnSnow forever. Run with forge test --match-test test_F3_GlobalEarnTimerGriefing -vv.

function test_F3_GlobalEarnTimerGriefing() public {
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 2 weeks);
vm.prank(alice);
snow.earnSnow(); // alice's earn window starts
​
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 6 days); // alice is just about able to earn again
vm.prank(attacker);
snow.buySnow{value: 0}(0); // free no-op, resets the global timer
vm.prank(alice);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow(); // alice is locked out again
}
}

Result: PASS — across every cycle Alice reverts with S__Timer() while the attacker spends nothing but gas.

Recommended Mitigation

Track the cooldown per user and stop buySnow from touching it:

- uint256 private s_earnTimer;
+ mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastEarn;
​
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
- if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
+ if (s_lastEarn[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_lastEarn[msg.sender] + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
+ s_lastEarn[msg.sender] = block.timestamp;
}
​
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
// ... payment logic ...
- s_earnTimer = block.timestamp;
emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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