Snowman Merkle Airdrop

AI First Flight #10
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Snow earn timer is a single global variable shared by all users (and reset by buySnow), so one user can block everyone's weekly free Snow

Root + Impact

earnSnow is documented as letting each user earn 1 Snow per week, but the cooldown is tracked in one contract-wide storage slot, s_earnTimer. Every successful earnSnow, by anyone, restarts the week for the entire protocol, so in practice only a single user per week can ever earn, and every other user's claim reverts with S__Timer. buySnow writes the same global timer, so ordinary purchases also push everyone's free claim a week out. A griefer can keep the faucet locked forever at trivial cost: call earnSnow (free) once per week, front-running the window, and no other user can ever earn again; or make a minimal purchase whenever the timer is about to expire. The free distribution mechanic is effectively first-come-only for one address per week, protocol-wide.

Description

uint256 private s_earnTimer; // one timer for ALL users
​
function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow {
// @> if (s_earnTimer != 0 && block.timestamp < (s_earnTimer + 1 weeks)) {
revert S__Timer();
}
_mint(msg.sender, 1);
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // resets the cooldown for everyone
}
​
function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow {
...
s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; // a purchase also resets everyone's earn timer
}

Risk

Likelihood: High - the failure mode needs no attacker at all: any two honest users who both try to earn in the same week collide. Deliberate griefing is also free (a weekly earnSnow call).
Impact: Medium - the documented weekly earning mechanic is denied to effectively all users; distribution of Snow (and therefore access to Snowman claims) is throttled to one free mint per week across the whole protocol, and the timer can be held hostage indefinitely.

Proof of Concept

Verified with Foundry (test passes). Alice earns her Snow; Bob's earn in the same period reverts with S__Timer. After warping one week Bob earns successfully, then Carol simply buys 1 Snow, and Dave's earn reverts again because the purchase reset the shared timer.

vm.prank(bob);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow(); // blocked by alice's earn
// after carol buySnow(...):
vm.prank(dave);
vm.expectRevert(Snow.S__Timer.selector);
snow.earnSnow(); // blocked by carol's purchase

Recommended Mitigation

Track the cooldown per user, mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastEarn, and do not touch the earn timer in buySnow (buying and free earning are separate mechanics).

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-02] Global Timer Reset in Snow::buySnow Denies Free Claims for All Users

## Description: The `Snow::buySnow` function contains a critical flaw where it resets a global timer `(s_earnTimer)` to the current block timestamp on every invocation. This timer controls eligibility for free token claims via `Snow::earnSnow()`, which requires 1 week to pass since the last timer reset. As a result: Any token purchase `(via buySnow)` blocks all free claims for all users for 7 days Malicious actors can permanently suppress free claims with micro-transactions Contradicts protocol documentation promising **"free weekly claims per user"** ## Impact: * **Complete Denial-of-Service:** Free claim mechanism becomes unusable * **Broken Protocol Incentives:** Undermines core user acquisition strategy * **Economic Damage:** Eliminates promised free distribution channel * **Reputation Harm:** Users perceive protocol as dishonest ```solidity function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { if (msg.value == (s_buyFee * amount)) { _mint(msg.sender, amount); } else { i_weth.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), (s_buyFee * amount)); _mint(msg.sender, amount); } @> s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` ## Risk **Likelihood**: • Triggered by normal protocol usage (any purchase) • Requires only one transaction every 7 days to maintain blockage • Incentivized attack (low-cost disruption) **Impact**: • Permanent suppression of core protocol feature • Loss of user trust and adoption • Violates documented tokenomics ## Proof of Concept **Attack Scenario:** Permanent Free Claim Suppression * Attacker calls **buySnow(1)** with minimum payment * **s\_earnTimer** sets to current timestamp (T0) * All **earnSnow()** calls revert for **next 7 days** * On day 6, attacker repeats **buySnow(1)** * New timer reset (T1 = T0+6 days) * Free claims blocked until **T1+7 days (total 13 days)** * Repeat step **4 every 6 days → permanent blockage** **Test Case:** ```solidity // Day 0: Deploy contract snow = new Snow(...); // s_earnTimer = 0 // UserA claims successfully snow.earnSnow(); // Success (first claim always allowed) // Day 1: UserB buys 1 token snow.buySnow(1); // Resets global timer to day 1 // Day 2: UserA attempts claim snow.earnSnow(); // Reverts! Requires day 1+7 = day 8 // Day 7: UserC buys 1 token (day 7 < day 1+7) snow.buySnow(1); // Resets timer to day 7 // Day 8: UserA retries snow.earnSnow(); // Still reverts! Now requires day 7+7 = day 14 ``` ## Recommended Mitigation **Step 1:** Remove Global Timer Reset from `buySnow` ```diff function buySnow(uint256 amount) external payable canFarmSnow { // ... existing payment logic ... - s_earnTimer = block.timestamp; emit SnowBought(msg.sender, amount); } ``` **Step 2:** Implement Per-User Timer in `earnSnow` ```solidity // Add new state variable mapping(address => uint256) private s_lastClaimTime; function earnSnow() external canFarmSnow { // Check per-user timer instead of global if (s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] != 0 && block.timestamp < s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] + 1 weeks ) { revert S__Timer(); } _mint(msg.sender, 1); s_lastClaimTime[msg.sender] = block.timestamp; // Update user-specific timer emit SnowEarned(msg.sender, 1); // Add missing event } ``` **Step 3:** Initialize First Claim (Constructor) ```solidity constructor(...) { // Initialize with current timestamp to prevent immediate claims s_lastClaimTime[address(0)] = block.timestamp; } ```

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