Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage Collision on UUPS Upgrade Corrupts s_flashLoanFee

VULNERABILITY-02 — Storage Collision on UUPS Upgrade Corrupts s_flashLoanFee

Severity: Critical
File: src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol

Summary

ThunderLoan and ThunderLoanUpgraded have different storage layouts. Upgrading the proxy causes s_flashLoanFee to be read from the wrong storage slot — it will read the old s_feePrecision value (1e18), effectively setting the flash loan fee to 100% and breaking the entire protocol.

Vulnerability Details

ThunderLoan (original) storage layout:

slot N: s_tokenToAssetToken (mapping)
slot N+1: s_feePrecision ← uint256 private (value: 1e18)
slot N+2: s_flashLoanFee ← uint256 private (value: 3e15)
slot N+3: s_currentlyFlashLoaning (mapping)

ThunderLoanUpgraded storage layout:

slot N: s_tokenToAssetToken (mapping)
slot N+1: s_flashLoanFee ← uint256 private (MOVED — was N+2)
slot N+2: s_currentlyFlashLoaning (mapping)

In ThunderLoanUpgraded, s_feePrecision was removed as a state variable and replaced with FEE_PRECISION as a constant. Constants do not occupy storage slots. This shifts s_flashLoanFee from slot N+2 to slot N+1. After upgrading, s_flashLoanFee reads the value 1e18 (the old s_feePrecision), making fee = 100%.

// ThunderLoan (original)
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot N+1 ← REMOVED in upgraded version
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+2
// ThunderLoanUpgraded
// FEE_PRECISION is a constant — no slot consumed
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+1 ← reads old s_feePrecision (1e18 = 100% fee!)

PoC

// test/exploit/StorageCollisionTest.t.sol
function testStorageCollisionOnUpgrade() public {
// Deploy original and initialize
ThunderLoan impl1 = new ThunderLoan();
ERC1967Proxy proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(address(impl1), "");
ThunderLoan thunderLoan = ThunderLoan(address(proxy));
thunderLoan.initialize(tswapAddress);
// Initial fee is correct
assertEq(thunderLoan.getFee(), 3e15); // 0.3%
// Upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded
ThunderLoanUpgraded impl2 = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(impl2));
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
// Fee is now corrupted — reads from old s_feePrecision slot
uint256 corruptedFee = upgraded.getFee();
assertEq(corruptedFee, 1e18); // BUG: 100% fee instead of 0.3%
}

Impact

  • Critical — All flash loan fee calculations are broken post-upgrade.

  • Flash loans become effectively impossible (100% fee = no borrower can repay).

  • Protocol is bricked without a re-upgrade, which itself requires owner intervention.

  • Liquidity providers lose all flash loan fee income permanently until fixed.

Tools Used

  • Manual storage layout analysis

  • Foundry storage slot inspection

Recommendations

Preserve the storage layout by keeping s_feePrecision as a state variable in the upgraded contract:

// ThunderLoanUpgraded — preserve slot order
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // keep to preserve slot N+1
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // remains at slot N+2 (correct)
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // constant is fine as alias

Or use OpenZeppelin storage gaps:

uint256[50] private __gap; // reserve slots for future upgrades
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 6 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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