Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[H-3] Storage Collision During Contract Upgrade Corrupts Protocol State

Storage Collision During Contract Upgrade Corrupts Protocol State

Description

  • The upgraded contract introduces a storage layout that does not preserve the original storage ordering of ThunderLoan. Specifically, a variable placed at storage slot 0 in ThunderLoanUpgraded overwrites data previously stored at slot 1 in ThunderLoan.

    Because Solidity assigns storage slots sequentially, any mismatch between old and new layouts results in variables reading incorrect values. This can affect balances, configuration parameters, and core accounting mechanisms.

    Such storage collisions are among the most severe upgradeability failures, as they permanently corrupt on-chain state and often require full protocol redeployment.

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This issue manifests immediately upon upgrading the contract. No user interaction or attacker involvement is required.

Impact:

  • High — Complete State Corruption and Protocol Failure.
    Critical protocol variables become overwritten, leading to incorrect accounting, broken logic, and unpredictable behavior. In many cases, the protocol becomes irreversibly unusable.

Proof of Concept


Please add this code on the test/ThunderLoanTest.t.sol. The result will give getFee() = 0;

function testCallingViewFunction() public setAllowedToken{
//thunderLoan
thunderLoan.getFee();
thunderLoan.getFeePrecision();
thunderLoan.isAllowedToken(IERC20(tokenA));
thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(IERC20(tokenA));
thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(IERC20(tokenA));
//AssetToken
AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA);
asset.getExchangeRate();
asset.getUnderlying();
//OracleUpgradeable
//ThunderLoanUpgraded
testUpgradeImplementation();
upgradedThunderLoan.getFee();
upgradedThunderLoan.FEE_PRECISION();
upgradedThunderLoan.isAllowedToken(IERC20(tokenA));
upgradedThunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(IERC20(tokenA));
upgradedThunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(IERC20(tokenA));
}

Recommended Mitigation

Please add the storage variable but dont add value at storage0, so the function getFee() will get the value back
/*//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
STATE VARIABLES
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////*/
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
+ uint256 unusedVariable
// The fee in WEI, it should have 18 decimals. Each flash loan takes a flat fee of the token price.
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 9 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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