Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

ThunderLoanUpgraded Breaks Proxy Storage Layout And Corrupts Fee State

Root + Impact

Description

  • A UUPS upgrade must preserve the exact storage layout of the old implementation. If a variable is removed or reordered, the proxy keeps the old values in storage, but the new implementation reads them using different slots.

  • That is exactly what happens here. `ThunderLoan` stores `s_feePrecision` before `s_flashLoanFee`, but `ThunderLoanUpgraded` removes `s_feePrecision`. This shifts the position of `s_flashLoanFee` and `s_currentlyFlashLoaning`.

    As a result, after upgrading an already-initialized proxy, the upgraded implementation reads old storage values as different variables. This immediately corrupts critical protocol state.

// ThunderLoan
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
@> uint256 private s_feePrecision;
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
@> mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
// ThunderLoanUpgraded
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
@> uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
@> mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The project explicitly plans to upgrade from `ThunderLoan` to `ThunderLoanUpgraded`.

  • Any upgrade of an initialized proxy to this implementation triggers the issue immediately.

Impact:

  • The upgraded contract reads the old `s_feePrecision` slot as the new `s_flashLoanFee`.

  • Flash-loan state tracking also moves to a different slot.

  • The upgraded system no longer interprets stored state correctly, which can break core protocol behavior.

Proof of Concept

The PoC upgrades a live proxy from `ThunderLoan` to `ThunderLoanUpgraded` and then reads the fee from the
upgraded implementation.
Before the upgrade, the proxy stores:
- slot 203: `s_feePrecision = 1e18`
- slot 204: `s_flashLoanFee = 3e15`
After the upgrade, `ThunderLoanUpgraded` expects `s_flashLoanFee` to be in slot 203 because `s_feePrecision`
was removed from the layout. That means the upgraded contract now reads `1e18` as the fee.
The assertion below proves the corruption by showing that `getFee()` returns `FEE_PRECISION`, not the original flash-loan fee.
function test_upgradeStorageCollisionCorruptsFlashLoanFee() public {
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgradedImplementation = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeToAndCall(
address(upgradedImplementation),
abi.encodeCall(ThunderLoanUpgraded.getFee, ())
);
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgradedThunderLoan = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(thunderLoan));
assertEq(upgradedThunderLoan.getFee(), upgradedThunderLoan.FEE_PRECISION());
}

Recommended Mitigation

Upgradeable storage must be append-only. Existing storage variables must never be removed or moved, even if the
new implementation no longer uses them.
The safe fix is to keep `s_feePrecision` in `ThunderLoanUpgraded` in the exact same position as the original
contract, then append any new variables only after the full old layout. This preserves slot compatibility for
already-initialized proxies and prevents state corruption after upgrade.
contract ThunderLoanUpgraded is Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable, OracleUpgradeable {
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
+ uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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