Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Upgrade storage-slot collision: after v1 -> v2 upgrade `s_flashLoanFee` reads stale `1e18` -> 100% flash-loan fee

Description

The protocol has an in-scope, planned upgrade ThunderLoan -> ThunderLoanUpgraded. The two implementations
store their state differently — a variable was deleted — so nothing occupies slot4 in v2 where v1 had a
different variable.

// src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol:95-99 — @> v1 layout
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot4 — initialized to 1e18 in initialize()
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot5 — initialized to 3e15 (0.3%) in initialize()
// src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol:98 — @> v2 DELETED s_feePrecision from storage
// (now a constant FEE_PRECISION), so s_flashLoanFee SHIFTS into slot4
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> slot4 — reuses v1's s_feePrecision storage
// src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol:246-251 — @> reads 1e18 as the fee -> 100% of borrow
function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) {
uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / FEE_PRECISION;
fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / FEE_PRECISION;
}

UUPS performs no storage migration on upgradeToAndCall. After the upgrade, s_flashLoanFee is read from
slot4, which still holds the v1 s_feePrecision value 1e18. initialize() cannot be re-run (the
Initializable guard), so the only way to restore a sane fee is a manual updateFlashLoanFee() call that the
protocol has no scheduled step to perform.

Root Cause

An upgradeable contract changed storage layout by removing a state variable and converting an identical value to
a constant, shifting every downstream variable one slot. No migration/backfill was provided, so the fee field
inherits the stale precision value.

Risk

Likelihood: Certain. The upgrade is part of the in-scope protocol plan; performing it deterministically
produces the broken state (the PoC shows it for the exact scoped upgrade pair). No privileged error beyond
performing the intended upgrade — the v2 code itself is the defect.

Impact:

  • getFee() == 1e18 -> getCalculatedFee returns 100% of the borrowed value as the fee. Every flash loan
    costs its full principal in fees, making the lending functionality unusable for borrowers and collapsing the
    LP market until an unplanned manual fix.

  • Because the fee also feeds updateExchangeRate (see the exchange-rate finding), the collateral damage is
    amplified: a giant fee is credited to LP claims while backing grows only by the fee actually repaid.

Proof of Concept

test/poc/PocUpgradeSlotCollision.t.sol (asserts the buggy post-upgrade state):

function test_PoC_UpgradeCollision_100PercentFee() public {
// deploy v1 over a proxy + initialize (matches production deployment)
ThunderLoan v1 = new ThunderLoan();
ERC1967Proxy proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(address(v1), "");
ThunderLoanUpgraded thunderLoan = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
thunderLoan.initialize(address(factory));
// perform the in-scope upgrade v1 -> v2
vm.startPrank(thunderLoan.owner());
ThunderLoanUpgraded v2 = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)).upgradeToAndCall(address(v2), "");
vm.stopPrank();
// fee now reads the stale s_feePrecision value 1e18 instead of 0.3%
uint256 fee = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)).getFee();
assertEq(fee, 1e18, "post-upgrade fee is 100% (should be 3e15 = 0.3%)");
// and getCalculatedFee returns the FULL borrowed value
uint256 calculated = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)).getCalculatedFee(tokenA, 1000e18);
uint256 valueOfBorrow = (1000e18 * price) / FEE_PRECISION;
assertEq(calculated, valueOfBorrow, "fee == 100% of the borrow value");
}

Run: forge test --match-contract PocUpgradeSlotCollision -vv (PASS).

Recommended Mitigation

  • Keep the storage slot occupied (don't delete s_feePrecision): keep uint256 private s_feePrecision; in v2
    (unused or repurposed) so s_flashLoanFee stays at slot5 across the upgrade.

  • Alternatively, backfill s_flashLoanFee in the upgrade call (upgradeToAndCall(v2, callData) to a
    postUpgradeSetup() that sets the fee), and add it to the upgrade checklist.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!