Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

setAllowedToken(token, false) Orphans LP Funds

Root + Impact

Description

When the owner disallows a previously-allowed token, setAllowedToken calls delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token], which sets the mapping entry to address(0). The AssetToken contract itself is not destroyed and continues holding all LP-deposited underlying tokens. However, every redemption path in ThunderLoan looks up the AssetToken via s_tokenToAssetToken[token], which now returns address(0). All LP redemptions are permanently bricked.

Furthermore, recovery via re-allowing the same token is blocked: the allowed = true path checks if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(). Since the mapping entry is address(0), this check passes but it deploys a new AssetToken contract with zero LPs, leaving the old one still carrying the funds.

Impact

  • All LP funds in that token's pool become inaccessible through normal protocol interface.

  • No recovery path exists in the contract.

  • High severity (not Critical) because it requires owner action to trigger.

Recommended Mitigation

Separate the concerns of "is this token allowed for deposits" from "where is the AssetToken contract." Add a dedicated allow-list mapping:

+ mapping(IERC20 token => bool) private s_allowedTokens;
function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) {
if (allowed) {
if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) {
revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed();
}
string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name());
string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol());
AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol);
s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken;
+ s_allowedTokens[token] = true;
emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed);
return assetToken;
} else {
- AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
- delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
+ s_allowedTokens[token] = false;
- emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed);
+ emit AllowedTokenSet(token, s_tokenToAssetToken[token], allowed);
- return assetToken;
+ return s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
}
}
+ function isAllowedToken(IERC20 token) public view returns (bool) {
+ return s_allowedTokens[token];
+ }

The s_tokenToAssetToken mapping is never deleted it always points to the existing AssetToken contract, allowing redemptions even when the token is disallowed for new deposits.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 5 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' can permanently lock liquidity providers out from redeeming their tokens

## Description If the 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' function is called with the intention of setting an allowed token to false and thus deleting the assetToken to token mapping; nobody would be able to redeem funds of that token in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function and thus have them locked away without access. ## Vulnerability Details If the owner sets an allowed token to false, this deletes the mapping of the asset token to that ERC20. If this is done, and a liquidity provider has already deposited ERC20 tokens of that type, then the liquidity provider will not be able to redeem them in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function. ```solidity function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; @> delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } } ``` ```solidity function redeem( IERC20 token, uint256 amountOfAssetToken ) external revertIfZero(amountOfAssetToken) @> revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate(); if (amountOfAssetToken == type(uint256).max) { amountOfAssetToken = assetToken.balanceOf(msg.sender); } uint256 amountUnderlying = (amountOfAssetToken * exchangeRate) / assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION(); emit Redeemed(msg.sender, token, amountOfAssetToken, amountUnderlying); assetToken.burn(msg.sender, amountOfAssetToken); assetToken.transferUnderlyingTo(msg.sender, amountUnderlying); } ``` ## Impact The below test passes with a ThunderLoan\_\_NotAllowedToken error. Proving that a liquidity provider cannot redeem their deposited tokens if the setAllowedToken is set to false, Locking them out of their tokens. ```solidity function testCannotRedeemNonAllowedTokenAfterDepositingToken() public { vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true); tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, AMOUNT); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, false); vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(ThunderLoan.ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken.selector, address(tokenA))); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, AMOUNT_LESS); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations It would be suggested to add a check if that assetToken holds any balance of the ERC20, if so, then you cannot remove the mapping. ```diff function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; + uint256 hasTokenBalance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(assetToken)); + if (hasTokenBalance == 0) { delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); + } return assetToken; } } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!