Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[H] The upgraded contract defines a different storage layout for state variables, which conflicts with the layout of the older contract version.

Root + Impact

Description

  • After the contract upgrade, the state variable layout remained unchanged, and all business functions continued to operate normally.

  • In ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol, inserting a new FEE_PRECISION among the other variables caused the variable storage slots to become misaligned.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
// The fee in WEI, it should have 18 decimals. Each flash loan takes a flat fee of the token price.
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> The storage slot that was originally s_flashLoanFee is now s_flashLoanFee.
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;

Risk

Likelihood:

  • [High]The upgrade is triggered by the contract owner via upgradeTo or upgradeToAndCall. Since ThunderLoanUpgraded is already provided as the designated upgrade target, the likelihood of this upgrade being executed is high. No attacker action is required — the vulnerability manifests automatically the moment the owner performs the upgrade. There are no preconditions, no special privileges needed by an external actor, and no probabilistic factors that could prevent the storage collision from occurring.

Impact:

  • In the upgraded contract, reading s_flashLoanFee actually reads the old contract’s s_feePrecision variable; the fee rate changes from 0.3% to 100%, causing dependent calculations to fail and resulting in loss of funds.


Proof of Concept

  1. Capture the normal fee before upgrade (s_flashLoanFee = 3e15)

  2. Upgrade implementation; initialize cannot run again (_initialized == 1), so slots are not reset

  3. After upgrade, s_flashLoanFee reads old s_feePrecision = 1e18 (100%)

  4. Receiver only has enough extra balance for a 0.3% fee, far below the 100% corrupted fee

import { ThunderLoanUpgraded } from "../../src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol";
function testPoC_H1_StorageCollisionAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits {
uint256 normalFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, AMOUNT);
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee();
console.log("Fee before upgrade (s_flashLoanFee):", feeBefore); // 3e15
console.log("Normal fee for AMOUNT at 0.3%%:", normalFee);
assertEq(feeBefore, 3e15);
ThunderLoanUpgraded newImpl = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner());
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(newImpl));
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgradedProxy = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
uint256 feeAfter = upgradedProxy.getFee();
console.log("Fee after upgrade (corrupted):", feeAfter); // 1e18 (100%)
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18, "Fee corrupted: reads old s_feePrecision slot");
tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), normalFee);
vm.prank(user);
vm.expectRevert(); // ThunderLoan__NotPaidBack
upgradedProxy.flashloan(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, AMOUNT, "");
}

Recommended Mitigation

Add s_feePrecision after s_tokenToAssetToken to maintain the same variable layout as the old version.

mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
// Legacy slot kept for upgrade-safe storage layout compatibility.
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 1 day ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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