The upgraded implementation removes ThunderLoan.sol::s_feePrecision
from storage and replaces it with a constant, causing subsequent state variables to shift into
storage slots previously occupied by different variables. Because the proxy retains the V1 stor‑
age layout across upgrades, ThunderLoanUpgraded interprets existing state using incompati‑
ble slots, causing ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol::s_flashLoanFee to read the previous
ThunderLoan.sol::s_feePrecision value and potentially corrupting subsequent state such
as ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol::s_currentlyFlashLoaning
V1
2 +---------------------+
3 | s_feePrecision | <- storage slot 0
4 +---------------------+
5 | s_flashLoanFee | <- storage slot 1
6 +---------------------+
7 | s_currently | <- storage slot 2
8 +---------------------+
9
10 DOWN UPGRADE
11
12 V2
13 +---------------------+
14 | s_flashLoanFee | <- now reads V1's old feePrecision slot (!)
15 +---------------------+
16 | s_currently | <- shifted
17 +---------------------+
18
19 FEE_PRECISION = 1e18 <- constant, no slot
Impact: The storage layout mismatch causes ThunderLoanUpgraded to interpret existing proxy state
incorrectly. In particular, ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol::s_flashLoanFeereads the previous
ThunderLoan.sol::s_feePrecisionvalue (1e18) instead of the configured fee (3e15), chang‑
ing the flash‑loan fee from 0.3% to 100%. Subsequent state variables are also shifted, potentially
corrupting protocol state and breaking flash‑loan functionality.
Bhavya Jain 6
Impact:
The storage layout mismatch causes ThunderLoanUpgraded to interpret existing proxy state
incorrectly. In particular, ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol::s_flashLoanFeereads the previous
ThunderLoan.sol::s_feePrecisionvalue (1e18) instead of the configured fee (3e15), chang‑
ing the flash‑loan fee from 0.3% to 100%. Subsequent state variables are also shifted, potentially
corrupting protocol state and breaking flash‑loan functionality
## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan
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