Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision in ThunderLoanUpgraded corrupts flash loan fee and state after upgrade

Root + Impact

Description

The issue

ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision as a storage variable and replaces it with FEE_PRECISION as a constant. Constants occupy no storage slot. This shifts every subsequent variable one slot earlier, causing s_flashLoanFee to land on slot 103 — the slot that holds s_feePrecision's initialized value of 1e18 — and s_currentlyFlashLoaning to land on slot 104, which held the old s_flashLoanFee value of 3e15.

// ThunderLoan (V1) — correct layout
// slot 102: mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) s_tokenToAssetToken
// @> slot 103: uint256 private s_feePrecision; // = 1e18
// @> slot 104: uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // = 3e15
// slot 105: mapping(IERC20 => bool) s_currentlyFlashLoaning
// ThunderLoanUpgraded (V2) — broken layout
// slot 102: mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) s_tokenToAssetToken
// @> slot 103: uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // reads 1e18 from old s_feePrecision!
// @> // FEE_PRECISION = 1e18 is a constant — no slot consumed
// @> slot 104: mapping(IERC20 => bool) s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // reads 3e15 from old s_flashLoanFee!

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The collision occurs deterministically the moment the upgrade is executed — no attacker action required

  • Every single call to getCalculatedFee() after upgrade reads the corrupted slot

Impact:

  • s_flashLoanFee reads as 1e18 (100%) instead of 3e15 (0.3%), making every flash loan charge 100% of the borrowed value in fees, completely bricking the protocol's core functionality

  • s_currentlyFlashLoaning reads stale numeric data from the old s_flashLoanFee slot, corrupting flash loan state tracking and potentially allowing repayment guards to be bypassed or incorrectly triggered

Proof of Concept

// After upgrade is applied:
// 1. Call getFee() on the upgraded proxy
// Returns: 1000000000000000000 (1e18 = 100% fee)
//
// 2. Call getCalculatedFee(USDC, 1000e6):
// valueOfBorrowedToken = 1000e6 * price / FEE_PRECISION
// fee = valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee / FEE_PRECISION
// = valueOfBorrowedToken * 1e18 / 1e18
// = valueOfBorrowedToken ← fee equals 100% of borrow value
//
// 3. Any attempt to updateFlashLoanFee(3e15) passes the guard:
// if (newFee > FEE_PRECISION) revert → 3e15 < 1e18, passes
// BUT writes to slot 103, which the proxy already initialized
// to 1e18 — owner must manually reset after every upgrade
// Assertion test demonstrating storage collision:
function testStorageCollisionOnUpgrade() public {
// Deploy V1 proxy and initialize
ThunderLoan thunderLoan = new ThunderLoan();
ERC1967Proxy proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(
address(thunderLoan),
abi.encodeCall(ThunderLoan.initialize, (address(mockPoolFactory)))
);
ThunderLoan proxiedV1 = ThunderLoan(address(proxy));
// Confirm V1 fee is 0.3%
assertEq(proxiedV1.getFee(), 3e15);
// Upgrade to V2
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
proxiedV1.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));
ThunderLoanUpgraded proxiedV2 = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
// V2 fee is now 1e18 (100%) — storage collision confirmed
assertEq(proxiedV2.getFee(), 1e18); // BROKEN
}

Recommended Mitigation

Preserve the original slot ordering in ThunderLoanUpgraded by keeping s_feePrecision as a storage variable. New variables must only be appended after the existing layout.

// ThunderLoanUpgraded — FIXED storage layout
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot 102
// @> Keep s_feePrecision to preserve slot 103
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot 103 — preserved
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 104 — preserved
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // constant — no slot
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning)
private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // slot 105 — preserved
// Any new V2 state variables go here at slot 106+
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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