Title: Storage collision on upgrade — fee reads old precision as 1e18 (100%)
Impact: High. Post-upgrade all flash loans charge 100% fee instead of 0.3%.
Likelihood: High. Guaranteed on upgrade — deterministic storage layout mismatch.
Reference Files: repos/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol:93-97,139-145, repos/src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol:93-97,139-144
Original ThunderLoan declares storage variables in order: s_tokenToAssetToken mapping (slot 0), s_feePrecision (slot 1, initialized to 1e18), and s_flashLoanFee (slot 2, initialized to 3e15). ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision and promotes it to a constant — but the Solidity compiler places constants in bytecode, not storage. This shifts s_flashLoanFee from slot 2 into slot 1, where the proxy still holds the old 1e18 value written by the original implementation's initialize(). Both contracts call _disableInitializers() in their constructors, permanently locking the initializer modifier so initialize() can never run on the upgraded implementation to reset the value.
The proxy storage is shared across implementations — removing a variable collapses the layout, and the remaining variable silently inherits the old slot's value.
Impact: High. Every flash loan after upgrade charges 100% of the borrowed amount as fee. Borrowing 10 ETH costs 10 ETH, making the protocol immediately insolvent — no rational user would take a loan at a 100% fee, yet the contract would drain any borrower who does.
Likelihood: High. The collision is triggered the instant the proxy's implementation address is updated via upgradeTo. No interaction required beyond the owner's upgrade transaction. While updateFlashLoanFee(3e15) could fix it, this is a separate onlyOwner transaction — the protocol operates with a 100% fee in the gap between upgrade and manual correction.
A borrower taking a routine 10 ETH flash loan post-upgrade would lose 10 ETH in fees instead of the intended 0.03 ETH, effectively donating their capital to LPs without realizing it.
This PoC demonstrates the fee jumps from 0.3% to 100% immediately after the UUPS upgrade, without any additional transaction.
Adding a gap variable at slot 1 preserves the original storage offset so s_flashLoanFee remains at slot 2 and reads its true 3e15 value. Alternatively, calling updateFlashLoanFee(3e15) in the same transaction as the upgrade would close the vulnerability window atomically.
## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
Submissions are being reviewed by our AI judge. Results will be available in a few minutes.
View all submissionsThe contest is complete and the rewards are being distributed.