Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision in `ThunderLoanUpgraded` — replacing storage `s_feePrecision` with a constant shifts later variables, causing `s_flashLoanFee` to read as 100% after the upgrade

Root + Impact

Description

  • The original ThunderLoan defines three storage variables after the inherited oracle slot: s_tokenToAssetToken (slot 1), s_feePrecision (slot 2), s_flashLoanFee (slot 3), then s_currentlyFlashLoaning (slot 4).

  • ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision and replaces it with a constant FEE_PRECISION. Constants are not stored, so every remaining state variable shifts up by one slot: s_flashLoanFee now occupies slot 2 (the slot that previously held s_feePrecision = 1e18). After a UUPS upgrade, the proxy's slot 2 still contains 1e18 from the original storage, so getFee() returns 1e18 — the maximum allowed fee. Every flash loan now costs 100% of the borrowed amount.

// src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol — original layout
@> mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot 1
@> uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot 2 <-- removed in upgrade
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 3
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // slot 4
// src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol — shifted layout
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot 1
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 2 <-- now reads old s_feePrecision = 1e18
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // no slot
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The README explicitly states ThunderLoanUpgraded is in scope as the planned upgrade. The bug fires on the first call to getFee() (or getCalculatedFee → flash loans) after the owner calls upgradeTo.

  • No attacker action required; the upgrade itself is the trigger.
    Impact:

  • s_flashLoanFee reads as 1e18 (100% of FEE_PRECISION). Every flash loan now costs the entire borrowed amount as fee, making the protocol's core feature economically useless.

  • LP redemptions are not directly broken, but the user-facing UX of the protocol is destroyed at the moment of upgrade with no straightforward rollback.

Proof of Concept

function test_BUG1_storageCollisionOnUpgradeReadsMaxFee() public {
assertEq(thunderLoan.getFee(), 3e15); // 0.3% before upgrade
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
vm.prank(owner);
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));
ThunderLoanUpgraded asUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
uint256 feeAfterUpgrade = asUpgraded.getFee();
// Bug: fee reads as 1e18 (100%), not 3e15
assertEq(feeAfterUpgrade, 1e18, "storage collision");
}

Output: fee after upgrade: 1000000000000000000 (1e18). Test passes.

Recommended Mitigation

When upgrading, preserve storage slot ordering. Two options:

// src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
contract ThunderLoanUpgraded is Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable, OracleUpgradeable {
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
+ // Preserve original slot 2 — even though now-unused, keep it to avoid collision
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision_DEPRECATED;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
}

Or use OpenZeppelin's storage-gap pattern from the outset and never reorder/remove fields without using __gap. Add a _disableInitializers() storage layout test (e.g. via forge inspect storage) to CI to catch this category of issue automatically.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 16 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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