Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage layout collision after UUPS upgrade sets s_flashLoanFee to 1e18 (100% fee), bricking all flash loans

Storage layout collision after UUPS upgrade sets s_flashLoanFee to 1e18 (100% fee), bricking every flash loan

Description

ThunderLoan is UUPS-upgradeable: upgradeToAndCall swaps the implementation while the proxy's storage stays in place, so V2's variable declarations must occupy the exact same slots as V1. In V1 (ThunderLoan.sol) the slots after s_tokenToAssetToken are s_feePrecision (slot 1, set to 1e18) then s_flashLoanFee (slot 2, set to 3e15). ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol deletes the s_feePrecision storage variable and replaces it with a constant, which shifts every following variable up one slot.

After the upgrade, s_flashLoanFee in V2 reads the slot that V1 wrote 1e18 into:

// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> now occupies V1's s_feePrecision slot => reads 1e18
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // @> constant, occupies NO storage slot

initialize() is initializer-guarded and cannot re-run to overwrite the bad value, and s_currentlyFlashLoaning also shifts a slot.

Risk

Likelihood:
Certain on any upgrade from V1 to V2 — there is no input or condition required; the collision is baked into the storage layouts.

Impact:
With s_flashLoanFee == 1e18, getCalculatedFee returns a fee equal to ~100% of the borrowed value. The endingBalance < startingBalance + fee check in flashloan can never be satisfied, so every flash loan reverts and the protocol's core function is permanently bricked.

Proof of Concept

Deploy V1, initialize, upgrade to V2, then read the fee getter and observe the collided value.

function test_storageCollisionAfterUpgrade() public {
// s_flashLoanFee was 3e15 in V1
thunderLoan.upgradeToAndCall(address(new ThunderLoanUpgraded()), "");
uint256 feeAfter = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(thunderLoan)).getFee();
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18); // reads V1's s_feePrecision slot, not 3e15
}

Recommended Mitigation

Preserve the V1 slot by keeping a storage placeholder in V2 instead of removing s_feePrecision, and validate with forge inspect ThunderLoanUpgraded storage-layout.

- uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
+ uint256 private s_blank; // storage placeholder, was s_feePrecision
+ uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
+ uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 6 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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