Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

setAllowedToken(token,false) deletes the AssetToken mapping with no supply guard, locking depositor funds

setAllowedToken(token, false) deletes the AssetToken mapping with no supply guard, permanently locking depositor funds

Description

Disabling a token should be safe, but the else-branch of setAllowedToken deletes the token -> AssetToken mapping entry unconditionally, without checking whether depositors still hold asset tokens.

// ThunderLoan.sol:238-243
} else {
AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; // @> no totalSupply()==0 guard before deleting
emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed);
return assetToken;
}

After the delete, isAllowedToken returns false, so both deposit and redeem revert via revertIfNotAllowedToken. The underlying is stranded in the now-orphaned AssetToken, which has no rescue path. Re-enabling the token deploys a brand-new AssetToken, permanently orphaning the old holders.

Risk

Likelihood:
Requires the owner to disable a token that still has deposits. This is an admin action, not attacker-triggerable, so likelihood is low — but it is an easy operational mistake.

Impact:
All depositor underlying for that token becomes irretrievable: redeem reverts, no rescue function exists, and re-enabling does not restore access to the old vault. Direct, permanent loss of user funds.

Proof of Concept

Deposit, disable the token, then confirm redeem reverts.

function test_disableTokenLocksFunds() public {
thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, 100e18); // LP has asset tokens
thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, false); // owner disables, mapping deleted
vm.expectRevert(); // ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken
thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, type(uint256).max);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Require the asset token supply to be zero (and no active loan) before deleting, or use a two-step deprecation that keeps redemptions open.

} else {
AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
+ if (assetToken.totalSupply() != 0) {
+ revert ThunderLoan__AssetTokenStillHasSupply();
+ }
delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed);
return assetToken;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 6 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' can permanently lock liquidity providers out from redeeming their tokens

## Description If the 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' function is called with the intention of setting an allowed token to false and thus deleting the assetToken to token mapping; nobody would be able to redeem funds of that token in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function and thus have them locked away without access. ## Vulnerability Details If the owner sets an allowed token to false, this deletes the mapping of the asset token to that ERC20. If this is done, and a liquidity provider has already deposited ERC20 tokens of that type, then the liquidity provider will not be able to redeem them in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function. ```solidity function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; @> delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } } ``` ```solidity function redeem( IERC20 token, uint256 amountOfAssetToken ) external revertIfZero(amountOfAssetToken) @> revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate(); if (amountOfAssetToken == type(uint256).max) { amountOfAssetToken = assetToken.balanceOf(msg.sender); } uint256 amountUnderlying = (amountOfAssetToken * exchangeRate) / assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION(); emit Redeemed(msg.sender, token, amountOfAssetToken, amountUnderlying); assetToken.burn(msg.sender, amountOfAssetToken); assetToken.transferUnderlyingTo(msg.sender, amountUnderlying); } ``` ## Impact The below test passes with a ThunderLoan\_\_NotAllowedToken error. Proving that a liquidity provider cannot redeem their deposited tokens if the setAllowedToken is set to false, Locking them out of their tokens. ```solidity function testCannotRedeemNonAllowedTokenAfterDepositingToken() public { vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true); tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, AMOUNT); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, false); vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(ThunderLoan.ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken.selector, address(tokenA))); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, AMOUNT_LESS); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations It would be suggested to add a check if that assetToken holds any balance of the ERC20, if so, then you cannot remove the mapping. ```diff function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; + uint256 hasTokenBalance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(assetToken)); + if (hasTokenBalance == 0) { delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); + } return assetToken; } } ```

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